2020
DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-0881-2
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Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies

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Cited by 75 publications
(75 citation statements)
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“…"games"). Provided selection is sufficiently weak, analytical results on the effects of heterogeneity on an evolving population can be derived in that setting as well [46]. In contrast, the analytical results presented here hold for any selection strength, with the trade-off being that they require the assumptions of frequency-independent fitness and sufficient regularity in the population structure and coloring scheme.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…"games"). Provided selection is sufficiently weak, analytical results on the effects of heterogeneity on an evolving population can be derived in that setting as well [46]. In contrast, the analytical results presented here hold for any selection strength, with the trade-off being that they require the assumptions of frequency-independent fitness and sufficient regularity in the population structure and coloring scheme.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Cohen et al (2016) estimate billions of dollars in consumer surplus from the UberX car service alone. 6 Brynjolfsson, Eggers, and Gannamaneni (2017) provide perhaps the most comprehensive estimate of the consumer surplus of the Internet by using (incentive compatible) choice experiments. For example, in one study, they asked people how much they would need to be paid in order to not have access to Facebook for a month.…”
Section: Consumer-level Effectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This interpretation naturally gives rise to other kinds of payoff accounting, such as concentrated or diffuse benefits [39]. When benefits are concentrated, every producer chooses a random neighbor and pays a cost, c , to confer a benefit, b , on this neighbor only (“ cf -goods,” where “ c ” indicates that the benefit is concentrated and “ f “ indicates that the cost is fixed).…”
Section: Evolutionary Games and The Intensity Of Selectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the limit of weak selection, it is known that one can replace stochastic payoffs with deterministic payoffs (i.e. expected payoffs) without a loss of generality [39]. In particular, cf - and ff -goods exhibit identical dynamics when selection is sufficiently weak, on any population structure.…”
Section: Examplesmentioning
confidence: 99%