Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

Quan, Ji; Yang, Wei; Li, Xia; Wang, Xianjia; Yang, Jian-Bo

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2019.124994

Cited by 23 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 69 publications

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“…Exclusion strategy has been regarded as an important incentive for the evolution of cooperation [41,45,49]. In general, the exclusion is manipulated by refusing free-riders to be the beneficiaries of the game, but at a cost to excluders.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the evolution of cooperation, among which the role of incentives in promoting cooperation has been widely studied by researchers in a wide range of fields [26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40]. Previous experiments and theoretical studies have revealed that highlevel cooperation can be effectively maintained by excluding free-riders from the beneficiaries [41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52]. Concretely, Sasaki and Uchida introduced social exclusion strategy into the public goods game (PGG) and studied its evolutionary dynamics in infinite populations [41].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions

Liu

Chen

2022

Proc. R. Soc. A.

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Social exclusion has been regarded as one of the most effective measures to promote the evolution of cooperation. In real society, the way in which social exclusion works can be direct or indirect. However, thus far there is no related work to explore how indirect exclusion influences the evolution of cooperation from a theoretical perspective. Here, we introduce indirect exclusion into the repeated public goods game where the game organizer probabilistically selects cooperators after the first game round to participate in the following possible game interactions. We then investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation both in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. Through theoretical analysis and numerical calculations, we find that the introduction of indirect exclusion can induce the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors or the dominance of cooperators, which thus effectively promotes the evolution of cooperation. Besides, we show that the identifying probability of the organizer has a nonlinear effect on public cooperation when its value is lower than an intermediate value, while the higher identifying probability can maintain a high level of cooperation. Furthermore, our results show that increasing the average rounds of game interactions can effectively promote the evolution of cooperation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions

Liu

Chen

2022

Proc. R. Soc. A.

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“…Subsequently, five cooperative evolutionary rules including kin selection, direct reciprocity, and network reciprocity were proposed by Nowak [29]. At the same time, numerous mechanisms promoting cooperative emergence have been extensively studied, including rewards [30], punishments [31][32][33][34], social exclusion [35][36][37], and memory effects [38,39].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative emergence of spatial public goods games with reputation discount accumulation

Tang,

Wang,

et al. 2024

New J. Phys.

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To address issues like the tragedy of the commons, reputation mechanisms prove effective in promoting the emergence of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Previous research assumed that the increment of reputation is a fixed constant, however, the historical behavior of individuals with time preferences affects their reputation fluctuations on different scales. Inspired by this, we propose a framework for spatial public goods game that incorporates a reputation discount accumulation model with time preferences. In this model, players are classified as either long-sighted players or short-sighted players based on the significance of their historical behavior. Compared with short-sighted players, long-sighted players are more concerned with the impact of historical behaviors on the next game. Simulation results show that long-sighted cooperative players can resist the invasion of short-sighted defectors, and short-sighted defection strategies are eventually replaced by long-sighted cooperative strategies. This indicates that a higher discount factor facilitates the generation and maintenance of cooperation.

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“…Previous researches have illuminated a number of mechanisms including reputation to explain the evolution of cooperation [16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31]. Recent studies on strong reciprocity theory reveal that some individuals will not hesitate to pay costs to punish those who do not cooperate, even if these costs cannot be compensated [32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42]. The threat of punishment can limit the prevalence of uncooperative individuals and thus support cooperation [43][44][45].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors for the evolution of cooperation

Liu¹,

Chen²

2022

Preprint

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The view that altruistic punishment plays an important role in supporting public cooperation among human beings and other species has been widely accepted by the public. However, the positive role of altruistic punishment in enhancing cooperation will be undermined if corruption is considered. Recently, behavioral experiments have confirmed this finding and further investigated the effects of the leader's punitive power and the economic potential.Nevertheless, there are relatively few studies focusing on how these factors affect the evolution of cooperation from a theoretical perspective. Here, we combine institutional punishment public goods games with bribery games to investigate the effects of the above factors on the evolution of cooperation. Theoretical and numerical results reveal that the existence of corruption will reduce the level of cooperation when cooperators are more inclined to provide bribes. In addition, we demonstrate that stronger leader and richer economic potential are both important to enhance cooperation. In particular, when defectors are more inclined to provide bribes, stronger leaders can sustain the contributions of public goods from cooperators if the economic potential is weak.

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Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

Cited by 23 publications

References 69 publications

Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions

Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions

Cooperative emergence of spatial public goods games with reputation discount accumulation

Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors for the evolution of cooperation

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