Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions

Abstract

In this paper, we first review recent arguments about the direct perception of the intentions and emotions of others, emphasizing the role of embodied interaction. We then consider a possible objection to the direct perception hypothesis from social psychology, related to phenomena like 'dehumanization' and 'implicit racial bias', which manifest themselves on a basic bodily level. On the background of such data, one might object that social perception cannot be direct since it depends on and can in fact be interrupted by a set of cultural beliefs. We argue, however, that far from threatening the idea of direct perception, these findings clearly contradict the idea of hardwired theory of mind modules. More generally, we suggest that in order to further the understanding of social cognition we must take seriously insights about in-group and out-group distinctions and related phenomena, all of which are currently neglected in the mainstream social cognition literature. ?? 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

“…Gallagher & Varga's (2014) argument here is less clear. But they are definitely resistant to saying perceptual processes are made more complex by the addition of theory-or simulation-based inferences.…”

“…Typically they define perceptual processes negatively, by saying what they do not involve. One such negative thesis is that DSP does not involve theory-or simulation-based inference, since these are defined by DSP advocates as cognitive processes (e.g., Gallagher & Varga, 2014). Sometimes DSP's psychological thesis is more baldly stated by associating cognition with inference, and thus negatively defining perceptual mindreading in terms of non-inferential psychological processes (Gallagher, 2008b).…”

“…Even if these processes don't involve logical relationships between propositionally structured representations, most psychologists characterize these information-processing operations on representational states as inferences in a looser sense. Gallagher & Varga (2014) have explicitly backed off the strong anti-inference view by allowing perception to involve such "Helmholtzian" inferences; but they still deny that DSP involves theory-or simulation-based inference, which are treated as non-perceptual, cognitive processes.…”

“…Gallagher & Varga (2014) offer a few arguments. They first argue that Helmholtzian inferences "are not rich enough to underpin mindreading" (p. 193): Helmholtzian inferences are characterized as simpler processes required for basic object recognition, and do not make use of information about mental states.…”

“…The direct social perception (DSP) thesis is one recent attempt to recharacterize the phenomena of mindreading (e.g., Bohl & Gangopadhyay, 2014;Gallagher, 2008a,b;Gallagher & Varga, 2014;Gangopadhyay & Miyahara, in press;Krueger, 2012;Krueger & Overgaard, 2012;McNeill, 2012;Smith, 2010, in press;Zahavi, 2007Zahavi, , 2008Zahavi, , 2011. DSP rejects the idea that most mindreading involves an inferential process from perceptual information about a person's bodily and verbal behavior to a cognitive representation of the mental states underlying that behavior.…”