Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

Herschbach, Mitchell

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.001

Cited by 14 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Schubert (2009) proposed to conceptualize presence as a cognitive feeling, i.e., "a feedback from unconscious cognitive processes that informs conscious thought about the state of the spatial cognitive system" (p. 161). Following these notions, we consider presence an output of fast and effortless system 1 processing that is either closely tied to (Kahneman, 2003) or includes perceptual information (Herschbach, 2015). We conceptualize spatial presence as the intuition or gut feeling of users of being physically located in a mediated environment.…”

Section: The Current Approach: Presence Vs Plausibility From a Dual-mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Plausibility in the Experience of Spatial Presence in Virtual Environments

Hofer

Hartmann²,

Eden

et al. 2020

Front. virtual real.

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In the present study, we examine the effect of plausibility violations in a virtual environment (VE) on spatial presence. After reviewing research on the association between plausibility and spatial presence, we present a dual-systems approach to understanding the effect of plausibility (or violations thereof) on spatial presence. We conceptualize the feeling of being present in a VE as a lower-order cognitive process. Perceptions of plausibility violations might represent higher-order cognitive processes that could interfere with spatial presence. We present data from an experimental study in which we manipulated the external consistency (i.e., the plausibility) of the VE, cognitive load (to interfere with higher-order cognitive processes), and immersion to examine its effect on spatial presence. Results show that immersion was the most important factor driving the presence experience. We found no difference between low and high plausibility in spatial presence. Subsequent equivalence tests showed that the group exposed to the implausible VE did not feel less present than the group exposed to the plausible VE. We discuss the findings of our studies in light of our theoretical considerations and previous research.

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Section: The Current Approach: Presence Vs Plausibility From a Dual-mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Plausibility in the Experience of Spatial Presence in Virtual Environments

Hofer

Hartmann²,

Eden

et al. 2020

Front. virtual real.

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“…[A] hallmark feature of perception (vs. cognition) is its strict dependence on subtle visual display details; percepts seem to be irresistibly controlled by the nuances of the visual input regardless of our knowledge, intentions, or decisions. (2013,209) Other proponents of the view that perceptual processes are distinctive in being "controlled" by proximal stimuli include Palmer (1999, 5); Kanwisher (2001, 90); Frisby and Stone (2010, 16); Herschbach (2015); and Beck (2018).…”

Section: Stimulus Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeing Seeing

Phillips¹

2020

Preprint

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I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective‐taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective‐taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual‐process accounts of mindreading.

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“…Fina ly, when DSP is posited as a phenomenological or experiential claim, it op oses the idea that our experience of the mental states of others is always the experience of forming a belief about them via an inferential process from the conscious perception of their gestures and behavior (Herschbach, 2015). Thus, it rejects the idea that there is an actual inferential process, of which we are somehow aware, mediating between our perceptual states about the gestures and behaviors of others and our beliefs about their mental states.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…As mentioned above, when DSP is taken as a psychological claim, it op oses TT and ST. Now, according to the interpretation usua ly given by DSP advocates, TT defenders claim that the inferences in question involve a body of theoretical knowledge about the causal/rational relations between mental states, environmental stimuli and behavior. ST advocates, instead, posit a process of simulation of the likely mental states of the others and a subsequent inference that a lows the attribution of those simulated mental states to them (Herschbach, 2015) 9 . In any case, these inferential processes are genera ly considered to be sub-personal and tacit.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…6 Now, according to some philosophers, it is important to distin uish different ways of understanding DSP (Krueger, 2012;McNei l, 2012;Herschbach, 2015;Michael and De Bruin, 2015;Bohl and Gangopa hyay, 2014): as a psychological, epistemological or phenomenological claim. In the first place, DSP can be an empirical, psyc ological claim about what sort of mechanisms ena le us to attribute mental states to others (where it is frequently assumed that these mechanisms wi l be largely tacit or sub-personal).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Perceiving mental states: Co-presence and constitution

Danón

Kalpokas

2017

Filosofia Unisinos

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Recently, several philosophers have called attention to the idea that there are occasions on which we can perceive (at least some) mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals in this direction: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 2010) and the hybrid model (Krueger and Overgaard, 2012). We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections to both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts which allows us to avoid such objections. Broadly stated, our idea is that by perceiving other people's behaviors we also perceive their mental states because behaviors co-present some features of the latter, and that this perception of others' minds is direct and immediate because behavior is a constitutive part of the mental states in question.Keywords: mindreading, hybrid model, direct perception of other minds, co-presence thesis. RESUMONos últimos tempos, vários filósofos têm defendido a ideia de que, por vezes, podem-se perceber (pelo menos alguns) estados mentais dos outros. Neste artigo, vamos considerar duas propostas neste sentido: a tese da copresença (Smith, 2010) e o modelo híbrido (Krueger e Overgaard, 2012). Vamos examinar as alternativas mencionadas e apresentar algumas objeções contra eles. Então, vamos propor uma maneira de integrar ambas as explicações que nos permite evitar tais acusações. No geral, a nossa ideia é que, quando percebemos o comportamento dos outros nós também percebemos seus estados mentais, porque os estados mentais são coapresentados no comportamento, e que esta percepção das mentes dos outros é direta e imediata, porque o comportamento é parte integrante dos estados mentais em questão.Palavras-chave: leitura mental, modelo híbrido, a percepção direta de outras mentes , tese de copresença.

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Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

Cited by 14 publications

References 56 publications

The Role of Plausibility in the Experience of Spatial Presence in Virtual Environments

The Role of Plausibility in the Experience of Spatial Presence in Virtual Environments

Seeing Seeing

Perceiving mental states: Co-presence and constitution

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