Social Cognition Modulates the Sensory Coding of Observed Gaze Direction

Abstract

Gaze direction is an important social signal in both human and nonhuman primates, providing information about conspecifics' attention, interests, and intentions. Single-unit recordings in macaques have revealed neurons selective for others' specific gaze direction. A parallel functional organization in the human brain is indicated by gaze-adaptation experiments, in which systematic distortions in gaze perception following prolonged exposure to static face images reveal dynamic interactions in local cortical circuitry. However, our understanding of the influence of high-level social cognition on these processes in monkeys and humans is still rudimentary. Here we show that the attribution of a mental state to another person determines the way in which the human brain codes observed gaze direction. Specifically, we convinced observers that prerecorded video sequences of an experimenter gazing left or right were a live video link to an adjacent room. The experimenter wore mirrored goggles that observers believed were either transparent such that the person could see, or opaque such that the person could not see. The effects of adaptation were enhanced under the former condition relative to the latter, indicating that high-level sociocognitive processes shape and modulate sensory coding of observed gaze direction.

Perceived live interaction modulates the developing social brain

“…Consistent with this perspective, recent behavioral (e.g. Teufel et al, 2009) and neural evidence (e.g. Coricelli and Nagel, 2009;Rice and Redcay, 2016) from adults suggests that on-going social interaction involves mental state inference-or mentalizingabout one's social partner.…”

The observer observed: Frontal EEG asymmetry and autonomic responses differentiate between another person's direct and averted gaze when the face is seen live

“…Attention direction adaptation (Teufel et al, 2009) and automatic attention shifts by head orientation cues (Teufel et al, 2010a) has shown to be modulated depending on whether the participants were lead to believe that the other person was capable of seeing them or not via a video-link. Compatible with our previous propositions : Pönkänen et al, 2008, Teufel et al (2010b) proposed that mental-state attributions could modulate even the basic perceptual processing of social stimuli.…”

Mental state attribution and the gaze cueing effect

“…As with Nuku and Bekkering's observations, this shows that gaze cueing can be modulated by the observers' beliefs about whether the agent can or cannot see. In a further study using mirrored goggles, Teufel et al (2009) employed a gaze perception aftereffect in which prolonged exposure to a face gazing in one direction altered subsequent perception of where the face was looking (Jenkins, Beaver, & Calder, 2006). Teufel et al (2009) reported that this effect was enhanced when the observer believed that the agent could see through the goggles.…”

“…In a further study using mirrored goggles, Teufel et al (2009) employed a gaze perception aftereffect in which prolonged exposure to a face gazing in one direction altered subsequent perception of where the face was looking (Jenkins, Beaver, & Calder, 2006). Teufel et al (2009) reported that this effect was enhanced when the observer believed that the agent could see through the goggles. Langton (2009), however, has urged caution in concluding that mental state attribution modulates gaze effects.…”

“…A number of authors have recently shown that mental state attributions can occur during gaze cueing, in which the observation of where another person is looking influences attention allocation in the observer (Nuku & Bekkering, 2008;Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010;Teufel et al, 2009;Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). In the gaze cueing paradigm, a face is presented in the center of a display with its eyes and/or head directed to the left or right.…”