2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2007.06.001
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Social and economic determinants of Turkish voter choice in the 1995 parliamentary election

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 41 publications
(29 citation statements)
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“…These are far more than the usual amounts of erosion that can be expected in the vote shares of incumbent parties due controversial decisions they make while in office and due to voter efforts to create checks and balances against their power. The depreciation in the political capitals of the ruling parties implied by these figures is substantially higher than what Akarca and Tansel (2007) found for the period 1991-1995, for example. These losses no doubt reflect partially the disappointment of their supporters all over the country with the way they have responded to the earthquakes and with their failure to stop or prosecute the people involved in earthquake related corruption.…”
Section: Resultscontrasting
confidence: 39%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…These are far more than the usual amounts of erosion that can be expected in the vote shares of incumbent parties due controversial decisions they make while in office and due to voter efforts to create checks and balances against their power. The depreciation in the political capitals of the ruling parties implied by these figures is substantially higher than what Akarca and Tansel (2007) found for the period 1991-1995, for example. These losses no doubt reflect partially the disappointment of their supporters all over the country with the way they have responded to the earthquakes and with their failure to stop or prosecute the people involved in earthquake related corruption.…”
Section: Resultscontrasting
confidence: 39%
“…It is largely ethnic based and is affected a lot by the terror activities in this region and the government's response to them. Akarca (2008) As shown in Akarca (2008) and Akarca and Tansel (2007), the vote shares of parties in a province depend also on the socioeconomic characteristics of the population living in that province. For that reason, we included in each vote equation, mean years of schooling for population over age of 6, the urbanization rate, and the proportion of women in non-agricultural employment as well, as independent variables.…”
Section: Background Methods and Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Looking at macroeconomic determinants of electoral support for incumbents in Turkey between 1950 and 1995, Carkoglu () asserts that there is indeed evidence that governments have been rewarded or punished for their economic performance. Analysing the 1995 Turkish parliamentary election with a unique set of cross‐section data, Akarca and Tansel () claim that Turkish voters do consider the government's economic performance – they do not, however, look back further than one year. They also concluded that while poor performance benefits extremist opposition parties at the expense of the major incumbent party, the minor incumbent and the centrist opposition parties seemed to be unaffected by economic conditions, where the party preferences of Turkish voters could also be explained by their socioeconomic characteristics.…”
Section: Studies On Electoral Outcomes In Turkeymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Third, the ones left behind may be just waiting for their turn to migrate and thus lose interest in local affairs. In the case of IMMIGRANT, if voting is habit-forming as some studies on other countries show, and if the political behavior of the migrants is similar to the behavior of the people in their origin areas -as Pikkov (2011), Akarca and Başlevent (2010) and Akarca and Tansel (2007) show-then we would expect a smaller portion of immigrants to cast a ballot compared to the native born population. As explained above, migrant producing provinces have low turnout rates.…”
Section: Turnout and Its Determinantsmentioning
confidence: 99%