Impact of Internal Migration on Political Participation in Turkey

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe Impact of population mobility on provincial turnout rates in the 2011 Turkish parliamentary election is studied, controlling for the effects of other socio-economic, demographic, political and institutional factors. Consequences of migration both at destinations and origins are considered. According to the robust regressions estimated, the relationship between turnout and education is inverse U-shaped, and between turnout and age (including generational effects), it is U-shaped. Immigration, emigration, large population, a large number of parliament members elected from a constituency, participation by large number of parties, and existence of a dominant party depress the turnout rate. However, at destinations where large numbers of immigrants from different regions are concentrated, the opportunity afforded to them to elect one of their own reduces the adverse impact of immigration significantly and in some cases even turns it to positive. That emigration, and education beyond certain level, have negative effects on turnout, that immigration's adverse effect is less in areas with high migrant concentrations, and that in Turkey, political participation is highest among the youngest voters are the novel findings of the study. The latter finding may explain why voter turnout declines in Europe and North America but not in Turkey.JEL Classifications: D72; J61

Transnational remittances and state protection of human rights: A case for caution

“…Relative to the situation where the household receives no remittances and does not participate in the process of mobilization, will the access to remittance income necessarily induce participation? Recall that evidence on the political engagement of high migration communities is quite ambiguous, at least when such engagement is identified as electoral participation (Goodman & Hiskey, ; Pérez‐Armendáriz & Crow, ; Akarca & Tansel, ) . As argued subsequently, the lack of clarity in the evidence may reflect the underlying ambiguity in how the access to remittances shapes household incentives for political mobilization.…”

Analysis of big patient mobility data for identifying medical regions, spatio-temporal characteristics and care demands of patients on the move

“…Residents of Istanbul who originally migrated from distant areas tend to keep their ties to where they migrated from, often own second homes, and have relatives in those provinces. Patients that seek health care in these large cities often stay with relatives or connections through home town organizations [ 32 , 33 ] when they receive their specialized medical care [ 32 , 34 – 36 ]. Ankara and Izmir, the second and the third largest city in Turkey, also attract migrants however, not from far locations, rather from the nearby provinces.…”

“…Patient mobility could result from a diverse set of reasons such as the number of hospitals/specialists, the number of beds, advanced health technology, lack of specialized centers, mistrust, comfort and cleaning of health care centers price, accessibility, seasonal migration and distances between origin and destination provinces [ 42 – 45 ]. Another factor is the presence of contact people through kinship and family ties at the destination as a result of past migration [ 36 ].…”

Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants: Theory and Experimental Evidence from India

“…Changing place of residence in Costa Rica "disrupts" voting and is associated with an eight to nine percentage point reduction in turnout propensity (Alfaro-Redondo 2016, 73). Focusing on Turkish municipalities, Akarca and Tansel (2015) estimate a strong negative province-level relationship between in-migration and electoral participation. Gay (2012) shows for the United States that use of a randomly assigned housing-relocation voucher reduced the probability of voting in national elections by seven percentage points.…”