Smart Voting

Colley, Rachael; Grandi, Umberto; Novaro, Arianna

doi:10.24963/ijcai.2020/240

Cited by 15 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…There are other representative scenarios where the incentive design of information diffusion deserves further investigation beyond auction. For example, how to conduct a more credible election or voting [Colley et al, 2020] by encouraging more people to join; how to facilitate a good organ donation [Roth et al, 2004;Roth et al, 2005] and transplantation system in a networked scenario; how to incentivize more people into a rating system; and how to notice more citizens to conduct public opinion surveys. Any other mechanism design scenarios where attracting more participants is needed can also be extended into social network settings.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks

Guo

Dong

2021

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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In recent years, a new branch of auction models called diffusion auction has extended the traditional auction into social network scenarios. The diffusion auction models the auction as a networked market whose nodes are potential customers and whose edges are the relations between these customers. The diffusion auction mechanism can incentivize buyers to not only submit a truthful bid, but also further invite their surrounding neighbors to participate into the auction. It can convene more participants than traditional auction mechanisms, which leads to better optimizations of different key aspects, such as social welfare, seller’s revenue, amount of redistributed money and so on. The diffusion auctions have recently attracted a discrete interest in the algorithmic game theory and market design communities. This survey summarizes the current progress of diffusion auctions.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks

Guo

Dong

2021

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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“…Since the creation of the Ethereum blockchain (Wood, 2014), Turing-complete 1 smart contracts can be placed on a blockchain. This means that any mechanism design can be enforced via smart contracts, including the vote transfer mechanism that we describe in this paper and, of course, other delegation mechanisms of votes in the context of liquid democracy (see Kotsialou and Riley, 2020, Colley et al, 2020, Escoffier et al, 2020, Brill and Talmon, 2018, Gölz et al, 2018, Boldi et al, 2011. Note that blockchain experts have already started experimenting by building voting mechanisms on blockchains, with some of the first examples including the following: McCorry et al (2017) uses smart contracts to avoid using any trusted authority to either complete the tally or protect the voters' privacy, Riley et al (2019) show how smart contracts are used to keep track of company shareholdings, allowing for real-time elections on company matters in a decentralised manner on the blockchain.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes

Dhillon¹,

Kotsialou²,

Xefteris³

2021

Preprint

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Recent developments in blockchain technology have made possible greater progress on secure electronic voting, opening the way to better ways of democratic decision making. In this paper we formalise the features of ``liquid democracy'' which allows voters to delegate their votes to other voters, and we explore whether it improves information aggregation as compared to direct voting. We consider a two-alternative setup with truth-seeking voters (informed and uninformed) and partisan ones (leftists and rightists), and we show that delegation improves information aggregation in finite elections. We also propose a mechanism that further improves the information aggregation properties of delegation in private information settings, by guaranteeing that all vote transfers are from uninformed to informed truth-seeking voters. Delegation offers effective ways for truth-seeking uninformed voters to boost the vote-share of the alternative that matches the state of the world in all considered setups and hence deserves policy makers' attention.

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“…In Section 2 we introduce our model of multi-agent ranked delegations, which we call smart voting, building upon the model introduced in previous work [19]. Our smart ballots give more expressivity to the agents than those from previous models of delegative democracy.…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this section we recall the definitions of our model for multi-agent ranked delegations in voting, which has been previously introduced as smart voting [19]. The model allows agents to decide if they want to vote directly on the issues at stake, or to give (possibly complex and/or multiple) delegations to determine their vote from the votes of others in the electorate.…”

Section: Smart Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unravelling multi-agent ranked delegations

Colley¹,

Grandi²,

Novaro³

2021

Preprint

Self Cite

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We introduce a voting model with multi-agent ranked delegations. This model generalises liquid democracy in two aspects: first, an agent's delegation can use the votes of multiple other agents to determine their own-for instance, an agent's vote may correspond to the majority outcome of the votes of a trusted group of agents; second, agents can submit a ranking over multiple delegations, so that a backup delegation can be used when their preferred delegations are involved in cycles. The main focus of this paper is the study of unravelling procedures that transform the delegation ballots received from the agents into a profile of direct votes, from which a winning alternative can then be determined by using a standard voting rule. We propose and study six such unravelling procedures, two based on optimisation and four using a greedy approach. We study both algorithmic and axiomatic properties, as well as related computational complexity problems of our unravelling procedures for different restrictions on the types of ballots that the agents can submit.

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Smart Voting

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks

Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks

Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes

Unravelling multi-agent ranked delegations

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