Slow Progress on UN Rapid Deployment: The Pitfalls of Policy Paradigms in International Organizations

Abstract

When reform negotiations in international organizations (IOs) produce limited substantive progress, the diagnosis is typically a lack of political will. We identify a different dynamic: in protracted negotiations, international policy paradigms can emerge that enshrine a politically realistic but incomplete issue definition and thereby focus the debate on a subset of policy instruments that do not fully address the underlying problem. We draw on the multilateral negotiations literature to show how policy paradigms—which are widely explored in Comparative Politics, but largely neglected in International Relations—can emerge even in heterogenous IOs, where deep cognitive cohesion is unlikely. The risk of negotiation failure incentivizes negotiators to adopt and maintain “achievable” issue and goal definitions, which over time are accepted as axiomatic by diplomats, IO officials, and policy experts. The resulting international policy paradigms help avoid institutional paralysis, but can also impede more ambitious reforms. To establish the empirical plausibility of this argument, we highlight the contemporary international policy paradigm of rapid deployment in UN peacekeeping, which focuses more on establishing an initial brigade-sized presence than on rapid deployment of the full peacekeeping force. Drawing on primary documents and interviews, we identify the roots of this First Brigade policy paradigm in reactions to the UN's failure to respond to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and trace its consolidation during UN reform negotiations in the 2000s and early 2010s. We also demonstrate that an alternative explanation of the paradigm as reflecting operational lessons-learned does not hold: a brigade-sized initial presence is rarely sufficient for mandate implementation, does not reliably speed up full deployment, and creates risks for peacekeepers. By highlighting the existence and impact of international policy paradigms, our study adds to scholarship on the role of ideas in International Relations and provides a novel perspective on reform negotiations in IOs.

Only as fast as its troop contributors: Incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the UN’s peacekeeping response

“…Second, we analyze historical shifts. Over time, the UN has sought to strengthen its rapid deployment arrangements (Coleman, Lundgren & Oksamytna, 2020). Since these policy changes have been gradual, it is impossible to identify clear discontinuities, so a better approach is to look at broader trends.…”

“…First, it enhances our understanding of rapid deployment in UN peacekeeping. The nascent literature on institutional arrangements to facilitate rapid deployment (Langille, 2014; Koops & Novoseloff, 2017; Karlsrud & Reykers, 2019; Coleman, Lundgren & Oksamytna, 2020) has not analyzed alternative explanations in a multivariate framework, and no study of rapid deployment has given sufficient consideration to contributor-level explanations. When a peacekeeping operation fails to deploy quickly, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is often blamed.…”

Problemas a escala mundial, la respuesta multilateral y la transición del orden mundial

“…El paradigma está formado por funcionarios de instituciones, diplomáticos nacionales y expertos en políticas en las etapas preliminares y tempranas del proceso multilateral para evitar un debate definitorio continuo durante el proceso de formulación de políticas. Sin embargo, se reconoce que el paradigma compartido puede no ser el correcto e incluso puede obstaculizar la formación de políticas si amplía la distancia entre las posiciones de las partes (Coleman et al, 2021). Por último, la respuesta política no debe incluir la incertidumbre sobre los efectos en los Estados interesados.…”

Eirene e Atena

“…The paradigm is formed in the preliminary and early stages of the multilateral process by the institution officials, national diplomats, and policy experts. It avoids the continuous definitional debate but is not necessarily the optimal one and can make difficult and even impede the formation of the decisional agreement if it contrasts the views of some states or widens the distance between the positions of the parties (Coleman et al 2021). Last, responding to any problem should not include uncertainty about the effects of the response to the affected actors.…”