Skeptical Theism, Abductive Atheology, and Theory Versioning*

Perrine, Timothy; Wykstra, Stephen J.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0011

Cited by 10 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…If it does, then the probability of that data, given the rival to theism, might be below .5 and thus it might "pass" the CORNEA-1 test for levering evidence. However, as I've argued elsewhere (Perrine and Wykstra (2014: 149 fn. 12), Perrine (2019: 117 fn.…”

Section: Application Of Cornea-1 To the Problem Of Evilmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…As there are a variety of arguments from evil (see Draper (2009) for a good overview), different skeptical theists propose different kinds of epistemological principles and different claims about our access to God's permission of evil, custom tailoring their responses to the argument at hand. (For more on skeptical theism in general, see Perrine and Wykstra (2014) or Perrine (2019: 118-121). )…”

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confidence: 99%

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On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA

Perrine

2021

SOPHIA

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Skeptical theism is a family of responses to arguments from evil. One important member of that family is Stephen Wykstra's CORNEA-based criticism of William Rowe's arguments from evil. A cornerstone of Wykstra's approach is his CORNEA principle. However, a number of authors have criticized CORNEA on various grounds, including that it has odd results, it cannot do the work it was meant to, and it problematically conflicts with so-called "Common Sense Epistemology." In this paper, I explicate and defend a CORNEA principle. After sketching a brief argument for it, I show how it can be acquitted of these recent charges.

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Section: Application Of Cornea-1 To the Problem Of Evilmentioning

confidence: 95%

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confidence: 99%

On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA

Perrine

2021

SOPHIA

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“…For even if one does not find my case convincing in (2018a) that the scope of skeptical theism is not narrow despite it being restricted to arguments from evil that rely on a noseeum inference, this is not a strike against skeptical theism as I have construed it, for it never claimed to apply to arguments that do not rely on such an inference. 13 For a recent discussion of the principle, see Kenneth Boyce (2014), Paul Draper (2014), and Timothy Perrine and Stephen Wykstra (2014), all contained in Trent Dougherty and Justin McBrayer (2014), and see also McBrayer (2009) Tooley (1991) and Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs (2016).…”

Section: Department Of Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail

Hendricks

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Arguments from evil purport to show that some fact about evil makes it (at least) probable that God does not exist. Skeptical theism is held to undermine many versions of the argument from evil: it is thought to undermine a crucial inference that such arguments often rely on. Skeptical objections to skeptical theism claim that it (skeptical theism) entails an excessive amount of skepticism and therefore should be rejected. In this article, I show that skeptical objections to skeptical theism have a very limited scope: only those who reject certain (apparently) popular epistemological theories will be threatened by them.

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“…Finally, let 'B' stand for our background information, which includes (2014: 224): …the "uniformity and steadiness of general laws," as well as the fact that the universe contains sentient creatures who can experience pleasure and pain and are 4 For other skirmishes on the relevance of skeptical theism to Humean arguments, see Dougherty (2014), ), Howard-Snyder (2015, Wykstra (2014), and.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…8 See, (e.g. ), the discussion of a similar thought experiment inPerrine and Wykstra (2014),Draper (2014), andBuchak (2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

Skeptical Theism and Morriston’s Humean Argument from Evil

Perrine

2018

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There's a growing sense among philosophers of religion that (i) Humean arguments from evil are some of the most formidable arguments against theism, and (ii) skeptical theism fails to undermine those arguments because they fail to make the inferences skeptical theists criticize. In line with this trend, Wes Morriston has recently formulated a Humean argument from evil, and his chief defense of it is that skeptical theism is irrelevant to it. Here I argue that skeptical theism is relevant to Humean arguments. To do this, I reveal the common structure of skeptical theism's critiques. Seeing the common structure reveals why some versions of skeptical theism are irrelevant to Humean arguments from evil. It also points the way forward to forming a relevant version. By combining skeptical theism with a plausible principle concerning reasonable belief, I formulate a version of skeptical theism that undermines Morriston's argument that is also immune from his objections.

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Skeptical Theism, Abductive Atheology, and Theory Versioning*

Cited by 10 publications

References 2 publications

On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA

On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA

Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail

Skeptical Theism and Morriston’s Humean Argument from Evil

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