Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail

Abstract

Arguments from evil purport to show that some fact about evil makes it (at least) probable that God does not exist. Skeptical theism is held to undermine many versions of the argument from evil: it is thought to undermine a crucial inference that such arguments often rely on. Skeptical objections to skeptical theism claim that it (skeptical theism) entails an excessive amount of skepticism and therefore should be rejected. In this article, I show that skeptical objections to skeptical theism have a very limited scope: only those who reject certain (apparently) popular epistemological theories will be threatened by them.

The Evolution of Suffering, Epiphenomenalism, and the Phenomena of Life: Evidential Problems for Naturalists

“…The skeptical theist, however, argues that if God exists, we would not be surprised to find that the justifying reasons for much suffering are beyond our ken. Thus, the appearance of gratuitous suffering is no evidence in favor of (2), at least for the theist or somebody who has not ruled out theism entirely for independent reasons (Wykstra 1984; see also Rowe et al 2001;Wykstra 2017;Hendricks 2020).…”

Skeptical Theism Proved

“…Richard Gale [1996], Stephen Maitzen [2014], Erik Wielenberg [2010], and Hud Hudson [2014b and 2017]), and many have responded to these skeptical worries (e.g. Bergmann [2012], Daniel Howard-Snyder [2009], Michael Rea [2013], and Hendricks [2018, 2020, and forthcoming]). I will not enter this dispute here, for it would take far too many words to do the problem justice.…”

Skeptical Theism: A Panoramic Overview (Part II)

“…1 1 There is a lot more to be said about the relevant issues here. For some discussion, see Piper (2008), Wielenberg (2010, 2014), Segal (2011), Rea (2013), O’Connor (2013), Boyce (2014), Hudson (2014), Law (2015), DePoe (2017), Russell (2018), Hendricks (2020). …”

“…4 4 There is a lot more to be said about the relevant issues here too. For some discussion, see Russell (1996), Almeida and Oppy (2003), Bergmann and Rea (2005), Jordan (2006), Piper (2007), Schnall (2007), Maitzen (2009, 2013, 2014), Howard‐Snyder (2009, 2014), Sehon (2010), Anderson (2012), Bergmann (2012), Wykstra (2012), Ribeiro and Aikin (2013), Rancourt (2013), and Hendricks (2020). …”

“…There is a lot more to be said about the relevant issues here. For some discussion, seePiper (2008),Wielenberg (2010Wielenberg ( , 2014,Segal (2011),Rea (2013),O'Connor (2013),Boyce (2014),Hudson (2014),Law (2015), DePoe (2017),Russell (2018), Hendricks (2020.2 Or, asBergmann (2009, 379; 2012, 12) himself later accepts, "we have no good reason for thinking that the total moral value or disvalue we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately reflects the total moral value or disvalue they really have. "3 Granted,Bergmann (2009, 376) uses talk of "good" and "evil" from within a broadly consequentialist framework (despite noting that his claims apply to any non-consequentialist view that takes consequences seriously as well).…”