Situationism, subjunctive hypocrisy and standing to blame

Epistemic Hypcocrisy and Standing to Blame

“…Blaming someone for a norm violation, while having committed a relevantly similar violation, seems to manifest a distinctive kind of fault. And the fault exhibited by the agents in these cases seems very similar to the fault of moral hypocrisy, which has recently received a lot of attention in the ethics of moral blame literature (Fritz & Miller, 2018;Herstein, 2017;Isserow & Klein, 2017;Lippert-Rasmussen, 2021;Piovarchy, 2020aPiovarchy, , 2020bRiedener, 2019;Roadevin, 2018;Rossi, 2018;Todd, 2019;Wallace, 2010). If I commit adultery, I cannot appropriately blame other people who are also guilty of adultery, for instance.…”

Excusing Corporate Wrongdoing and the State of Nature

“…Of course, we are discussing blaming firms for violating moral obligations that may not apply to us and that we have not ourselves failed to meet. Still, we will count as relevantly hypocritical if we likely would engage in the same wrongful behavior in their situation (Piovarchy, 2020). And, indeed, it seems likely that, were we in the state of nature, we would fail to meet obligations in order to protect our vital interests.…”

Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority

“…Someone who has not cheated on their partner only because they lack the chance to do so does not possess the standing to blame adulterers. Of course, it is difficult to know whether any blamer, given the chance, really would have done the same thing as the person they are blaming, which explains why objections to subjunctive hypocrisy are not all that common (Piovarchy, 2020).…”