Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority

Piovarchy, Adam

doi:10.1111/papq.12318

Cited by 14 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 46 publications

(66 reference statements)

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“…Blaming someone for a norm violation, while having committed a relevantly similar violation, seems to manifest a distinctive kind of fault. And the fault exhibited by the agents in these cases seems very similar to the fault of moral hypocrisy, which has recently received a lot of attention in the ethics of moral blame literature (Fritz & Miller, 2018;Herstein, 2017;Isserow & Klein, 2017;Lippert-Rasmussen, 2021;Piovarchy, 2020aPiovarchy, , 2020bRiedener, 2019;Roadevin, 2018;Rossi, 2018;Todd, 2019;Wallace, 2010). If I commit adultery, I cannot appropriately blame other people who are also guilty of adultery, for instance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Epistemic Hypcocrisy and Standing to Blame

Piovarchy¹

2022

Preprint

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This paper introduces the concept of epistemic hypocrisy, arguing that agents who culpably violate an epistemic norm can lack the standing to blame other agents who culpably violate similar norms. After disentangling our criticism of epistemic hypocrites from various other fitting responses, I argue that a commitment account of standing to blame allows us to understand our objections to epistemic hypocrisy. Agents lack the epistemic standing to blame when they are not sufficiently committed to the norms they are blaming others for violating. This not only gives us a convincing account of epistemic standing to blame, it leaves us with a unified account of moral standing and epistemic standing. I also consider some potential asymmetries between the standing to engage in moral blame and the standing to engage in epistemic blame, arguing such asymmetries are either only apparent or can be explained away by extraneous factors.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Epistemic Hypcocrisy and Standing to Blame

Piovarchy¹

2022

Preprint

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“…Little attention has been given to what, exactly, 'having standing' is, as opposed to what undermines it. One would expect the two questions to be connected (Piovarchy 2020). A promising-looking view is that those without standing to blame lack either the liberty right to blame or the normative power to impose on the blamee a duty to provide an uptake to the blame (and perhaps both) (Lippert-Rasmussen 2023: Ch.…”

Section: Lacking Standing To Remain Silentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Piovarchy 2020 proposes an analysis appealing only to the second disjunct. 10 I trust the reader to imagine circumstances in which remaining silent, literally speaking, can be communicative of blame.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Duty not to Remain Silent: Hypocrisy and the Lack of Standing not to Blame

Lippert‐Rasmussen

2023

The Philosophical Quarterly

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A notable feature of our practice of blaming is that blamees can dismiss blame for their own blameworthy actions when the blamer is censuring them hypocritically and, as it is often put, lacks standing to blame them as a result. This feature has received a good deal of philosophical attention in recent years. By contrast, no attention has been given the possibility that, likewise, refraining from blaming can be hypocritical and dismissed as standingless. I argue that hypocritical refrainers have a duty to blame, if asked to do so, and possibly even if they are not asked to do so. Acknowledging this fact about hypocritical silence is crucial to an adequate understanding of our practice of blaming. Specifically, it bears on a worry that naturally arises when we consider cases where the blamee is blameworthy yet the blaming is problematic, because standingless. The worry is that, absurdly, the idea of standing justifies our being more interested in silencing preachers of virtue than making wrongdoers overcome vice. However, if one can lack standing not to blame, this concern is unwarranted. If there is such a thing as standing to blame, then sometimes one must, for reasons of standing, speak up in the face of wrongdoing, meaning, in effect, that one lacks the right not to challenge wrongdoers to improve.

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“…Extended mind theorists have made this sort of argument, contending that our relationships form a kind of cognitive scaffolding, making responsibility‐promoting reasons and values more salient (e.g., Cash 2010, 660) and contending that access to a social audience makes us more responsive to reasons, and thus more capable of moral responsibility (Holroyd 2018, 143–44). Douglass draws our attention to how particular instantiations of audience and relationality can affect moral responsibility, creating the “standing” for moral judgment (Piovarchy 2020), even in the most unfree of circumstances. Whether with his fellow would‐be‐escapees or in the Sunday school, Douglass shows that it is slaves’ relative equality with their proximate group of subjects that provides the possibility of more fully realizing their moral agency.…”

Section: “Soul‐enlarging Soul‐sustaining Objects”mentioning

confidence: 99%

Can the Unfree Be Held Morally Responsible? A Douglassonian Conception of Freedom and Distributed Moral Agency

Singer

2022

American J Political Sci

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Can those dominated and oppressed by racialized power structures be held responsible for their actions? On some plausible accounts of moral responsibility, the answer is “no”: domination exempts the oppressed from moral obligations because they are structurally deprived of the freedom to make choices for which one might be blameworthy. In this article, I use the work of Frederick Douglass to offer a different understanding of moral responsibility. Attending to specific arguments that Douglass makes regarding the moral responsibility of slaves, and the tensions it raises with other parts of his corpus, I argue that one's ability to act as a moral agent is deeply tied to the environmental resources at their disposal. Drawing on distributed theories of cognition, I offer a Douglassonian conception of “distributed moral agency,” contending that Douglass's writings draw our attention to various environmental factors that can scaffold moral responsibility, even among the enslaved.

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Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority

Cited by 14 publications

References 46 publications

Epistemic Hypcocrisy and Standing to Blame

Epistemic Hypcocrisy and Standing to Blame

A Duty not to Remain Silent: Hypocrisy and the Lack of Standing not to Blame

Can the Unfree Be Held Morally Responsible? A Douglassonian Conception of Freedom and Distributed Moral Agency

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