Simulation of the Learning of Norms

Verhagen, Harko

doi:10.1177/089443930101900305

Cited by 47 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…On the other hand, they claim that three other problems are of interest in multiagent systems research on norms: how agents can acquire norms, how agents can violate norms, and how an agent can be autonomous. For artificial agents, norms can be designed as in legal human systems, forced upon, for example when joining an institution, or they can emerge from the agents making them norm autonomous (Verhagen 1999). Agent decision making in normative systems and the relation between desires and obligations has been studied in agent architectures (Broersen et al 2002), which thus explain how norms and obligations influence agent behavior.…”

Section: Normative Multiagent Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions with a hierarchy of authorities in distributed dynamic environments

Boella

Torre

2007

Artif Intell Law

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A single global authority is not sufficient to regulate heterogenous agents in multiagent systems based on distributed architectures, due to idiosyncratic local situations and to the need to regulate new issues as soon as they arise. On the one hand institutions should be structured as normative systems with a hierarchy of authorities able to cope with the dynamics of local situations, but on the other hand higher authorities should be able to delimit the autonomy of lower authorities to issue valid norms. In this paper, we study the interplay of obligations and strong permissions in the context of hierarchies of authorities using input/output logic, because its explicit norm base facilitates reasoning about norm base maintenance, and it covers a variety of conditional obligations and permissions. We combine the logic with constraints, priorities and hierarchies of authorities. In this setting, we observe that Makinson and van der Torre's notion of prohibition immunity for permissions is no longer sufficient, and we introduce a new notion of permission as exception and a new distinction between static and dynamic norms. We show how strong permissions can dynamically change an institution by adding exceptions to obligations, provide an explicit representation of what is permitted to the subjects of the normative system and allow higher level authorities to limit the power of lower level authorities to change the normative system.

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Section: Normative Multiagent Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions with a hierarchy of authorities in distributed dynamic environments

Boella

Torre

2007

Artif Intell Law

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“…One is recent work on the feedback between society and individuals by norms captured in the EmiL-project (Andrighetto et al (ming) (forthcoming)) the other is work on the learning of group norms by Verhagen (Verhagen (2001)). …”

Section: Models Of Normative Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three kinds of normative behaviour: minimal requirements for feedback models

Elsenbroich

Xenitidou

2012

Comput Math Organ Theory

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We present an analysis for modelling social norms. In social psychology three different normative behaviours have been identified: obedience, conformity and compliance. We show that this triad is a useful conceptualisation of normative behaviour and that current models only ever deal with conformity and obedience two, neglecting compliance. We argue that this is a result from modelling having so far focussed too much on agent behaviour rather than agent knowledge and that cognitive models of normative behaviour are needed to capture this third and arguably most interesting normative behaviour.

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“…Norms are not necessarily created by legislators, but they can also be negotiated among agents, or they can emerge spontaneously, making the agents norm autonomous [53]. In electronic commerce research, for example, cognitive foundations of social norms and contracts are studied [9].…”

Section: Norms and Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Norm negotiation in online multi-player games

2008

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In this paper, we introduce an agent communication protocol and speech acts for norm negotiation. The protocol creates individual or contractual obligations to fulfill goals of the agents based on the so-called social delegation cycle. First, agents communicate their individual goals and powers. Second, they propose social goals which can be accepted or rejected by other agents. Third, they propose obligations and sanctions to achieve the social goal, which can again be accepted or rejected. Finally, the agents accept the new norm by indicating which of their communicated individual goals the norm achieves. The semantics of the speech acts is based on a commitment to public mental attitudes. The norm negotiation model is illustrated by an example of norm negotiation in multi-player online gaming.

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Simulation of the Learning of Norms

Cited by 47 publications

References 5 publications

Institutions with a hierarchy of authorities in distributed dynamic environments

Institutions with a hierarchy of authorities in distributed dynamic environments

Three kinds of normative behaviour: minimal requirements for feedback models

Norm negotiation in online multi-player games

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