Simpler for evolution: Secondary representation in apes, children, and ancestors

Abstract

Great apes show behavioural evidence for secondary representation similar to that of children of about two years of age. However, there is no convincing evidence for metarepresentation in apes. A good evolutionary interpretation should be parsimonious and must bring developmental and comparative data in accord. I propose a model based on the work of Perner (1991) and close by pointing out a logical flaw in Heyes' second proposed experiment.

Visualizing How One Brain Understands Another: A PET Study of Theory of Mind

“…However, mentalizing as it occurs in daily life is not a simple cognitive process, nor is it usually passive. Evidence from evolutionary biology suggests that a fully developed TOM ability is limited to human beings and requires multiple cognitive capacities and systems (1,3,(12)(13)(14)(15)(16). It has been suggested that the capacities for language and episodic memory make some contributions to the highly developed human ability to mentalize (4,10,(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21).…”

From Mating to Mentality

“…Around this age they also begin to understand hidden displacement (Piagetian stage 6 object-permanence), demonstrate means-ends reasoning, show empathic behavior, engage in simultaneous imitation games, interpret external representations, and recognize themselves in mirrors (see , for a review). All these new displays are argued to be based on the ability to go beyond a direct model of the world and recombine elements of previous primary representations into past or novel (projected future or merely hypothetical) constellations (Asendorpf, Warkentin, & Baudonniere, 1996;Perner, 1991;Suddendorf, 1998b) and correlational findings in support of this have been reported (Asendorpf et al, 1996;Baudonniere, Margules, Belkhenchir, Pepe, & Warkentin, in press;Bischof-Kohler, 1989;Chapman, 1987;Lewis & Ramsay, 1999;Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2001).…”

“…The latter explanation requires more assumptions than the former. Furthermore, if those capacities discussed in the preceding are the product of a common history, then it is also likely that they are based on the same underlying psychological processes (Byrne, 1995;de Waal, 1996;Parker, 1996: Suddendorf, 1998b. This reasoning may be best described as the argument by homology (in contrast to the criticized 'argument by analogy', see .…”

“…Hare et al remain cautious in their interpretation (see also Call, 2001). They suggest that we should abandon the simple dichotomy between either having or not having a theory of mind (c.f., Suddendorf, 1998bSuddendorf, , 1999Whiten, 1996). Chimpanzees may occupy some middle ground in that they do have, as Hare et al (2001) suggest, some limited understanding of, for example, 'seeing' (level 1 perspective taking -knowing what others can or cannot see) without level 2 understanding (knowing how others see objects -e.g., from a different perspective) (Flavell, 1985).…”

Empirically Understanding Understanding can Make Problems go Away: The Case of the Chinese Room

“…Still, it is probably true that if we were to see for the first time a robot carrying out a complicated oral command given in a foreign language (Connell, 2000), at least some of us might say "Wow-the robot understood!" There is reason to believe, in other words, that many people, perhaps most, (including psychologists) would say that animals (e.g ., Suddendorf, 1998) and machines understand under certain circumstances.…”