Similarity and cooperation received as determinants of cooperation rendered

Kaufmann, Harry

doi:10.3758/bf03330765

Cited by 30 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…Initial expectations, formed on the basis of prebargaining information obtained about the opponent, are either confirmed or disconfirmed by the other's behavior. A bargainer expects more conciliatory behavior from a similar than from a dissimilar opponent (Abric & Kahan, 1972;Kaufman, 1967;Krauss, 1966). If he receives the expected cooperative response, he is likely to reciprocate, leading to a quick agreement and a favorable evaluation of that agreement.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…If he receives the expected cooperative response, he is likely to reciprocate, leading to a quick agreement and a favorable evaluation of that agreement. If, on the other hand, his expectations are disconfirmed by receiving few concessions, he is likely to retaliate by reducing his own concessions (Kaufman, 1967;Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 19751, leading to deadlock and dissatisfaction. This reasoning suggests that:…”

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confidence: 99%

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Determinants of bargaining behavior in a bilateral monopoly situation II: Opponent's concession rate and similarity

Druckman

Bonoma

1976

Syst. Res.

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This study investigates the process by which one member of an interpersonal system adjusts his expectations for the other's behavior on the basis of the other's concession rate and his perceived similarity. The process was explored in a bilateral monopoly situation where subjects, 52 eighth grade boys, assumed the role of buyer bargaining against sellers who were simulated according to a prearranged program. Strong effects were produced by both manipulations. As sellers became increasingly tough, buyers became increasingly soft. Increasing seller softness, on the other hand, resulted in no change in buyer softness. The former subjects expected larger seller concessions than they received; the latter predicted seller concessions accurately and conceded proportionately. Similar sellers elicited more buyer softness and more trials to agreement than dissimilar sellers. Internal data analyses revealed two types of bargainers in the high similarity condition: those who increased and those who decreased their level of softness in the final phase of bargaining. Additional evidence suggested that the latter subjects' behavior could be explained in terms of a disappointment in expectations caused by the nonreciprocating opponent and by their own previous high level of softness. The results are considered to have implications for a wider class of social situations involving both mutuality and opposition of interests. 0*1ILATERAL monopoly is a situation B where two parties are forced to deal exclusively with one another and to reach agreement in order to derive any profit from the interaction. It is a paradigm for a wider class of interpersonal situations involving both mutuality and opposition of interests. This study is concerned with the system of decisions whereby such conflicts are resolved. In bilateral monopoly, this system consists of converging decisions construed as concession exchanges.Since the publication of Siege1 and Fouraker's (1960) work, students of bargaining behavior have given considerable attention to the effects of alternative concession making strategies for eliciting concessions from an opponent. The Siegel-Fouraker prescription recommends a tough strategy. Others have prescribed softer strategies, KEY WORDS: bilateral mo,nopoly bargaining, conflict resolution, concession rates, opponent similarity, decision/expectation/adjustment.' The authors would like to express their gratitude to Ron Nowaczyk who served as the experimenter and to the Wilmette, Illinois, school system for providing the facilities and cooperation needed to carry out this research.

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confidence: 99%

Section: *1mentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of bargaining behavior in a bilateral monopoly situation II: Opponent's concession rate and similarity

Druckman

Bonoma

1976

Syst. Res.

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“…There is evidence that liking for a person arouses the expectancy that the other will provide benefits, while disliking arouses the opposite expectancy (Kaufmann, 1967). It is plausible that under high attraction Ss set higher comparison levels (Le., expected gains from the interaction) than Ss under low attraction.…”

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Attraction and reactions to noncontingent promises

Ayers

Nacci

Tedeschi

1973

Bull. Psychon. Soc.

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In a 2 by 2 factorial design, high or low attraction for a simulated player (SP) was induced in 40 female college Ss. During a mixed-motive interaction, the SP sent intermittent promises of cooperation to Ss; the promises were either 10% or 90% credible. Results indicated a main effect of promise credibility on S cooperativeness on message-relevant trials. Liking for and evaluation of the SP were inversely related to perceived potency. Changes in attraction from pre-to postmeasures supported an expectancy theory of attraction. Schlenker et al (1971) found no effect of interpersonal attraction for a simulated source of contingent promises upon S compliance. Tedeschi (1973) has suggested that attraction elicits rewarding or cooperative behavior only when the source of benefits is perceived as acting in an altruistic and nonobligatory fashion. Contingent promises may be perceived as contractual agreements, a type of economic exchange (Blau, 1964) which renders liking irrelevant. A noncontingent promise, which offers unilateral benefits, should promote the effects of attraction on the influence process. The first hypothesis of the present study was, therefore, that Ss would comply with noncontingent promises more often under conditions of high attraction than low attraction (HI).It should be expected that the proportion of times a promisor does what he says he will do (Le., credibility) will affect a target's reactions. A replication of the Gahagan & Tedeschi (1968) finding that target Ss were more cooperative in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (pDG) when the source of noncontingent promises was most credible was predicted (H2).There is evidence that liking for a person arouses the expectancy that the other will provide benefits, while disliking arouses the opposite expectancy (Kaufmann, 1967). It is plausible that under high attraction Ss set higher comparison levels (Le., expected gains from the interaction) than Ss under low attraction. These differences in expectancies would serve as a basis for disappointment or pleasant serprise and subsequent revision of liking for the other person (cf. Jones & Gerard, 1967; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959 have found support for the latter relationships. Furthermore, Ss who like a promisor should expect credibility to be high, since the congruence of verbal statement and behavior imply both the reliability of stated intentions and the beneficient cooperation of the promisor to achieve a joint gain. Conversely, low attraction should be associated with the expectancy that the promisor would not keep her word to be unilaterally benevolent and might in fact use false statements of intention to lure the S into an exploitative interchange. High attraction should lead to disappointment when the source's credibility is low, and low attraction should lead to pleasant surprise when the source's credibility is high. It is, therefore, predicted (H3) that in the high-attraction condition, high credibility will not change measured values of liking but low credibility will cause a decrement in liking, whi...

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“…Research by Krauss (1966), Swingle (1966), and Kaufmann (1967) has shown that interpersonal attraction has a beneficial effect on bargaining. But it is by no means an unequivocal prediction to state that attraction will enhance cooperation even more when threats are present.…”

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confidence: 99%