Silencing Critics

Abstract

The media hold democratically elected leaders accountable by exposing corruption and policy failures. Although many politicians accept media criticism as intrinsic to liberal democracy, some politicians rein in freedom of the press or intimidate media outlets to silence their critics. We identify circumstances that motivate and enable presidents to curb media freedom in presidential democracies. We argue that (a) presidents who hold ideological positions contrary to those of the mainstream media adopt the media as viable opponents in the absence of an effective electoral opposition, and (b) the media are vulnerable to presidential infringements on their freedom where legislatures and judiciaries hold weak powers relative to presidents, and are therefore unable to constrain presidents’ actions against media freedom. We support our argument with quantitative analyses of press freedom ratings in presidential and semi-presidential democracies from 1993 to 2013.

Fiddling while Democracy Burns: Partisan Reactions to Weak Democracy in Latin America

“…In the majority of these cases, the threat to democracy is not from outsiders looking to overthrow it via a coup but instead comes from elected insiders who weaken democracy from within by restricting electoral competition and curtailing the rights of their opponents (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). In many cases, this also includes leaders taking steps to limit media freedom and otherwise curtail criticism of their rule (Kellam and Stein 2016). Between 70% and 80% of democratic breakdowns since 1990 have resulted from an elected executive consolidating power (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Svolik 2019).…”

The Heterogeneous Effects of Government Size and Press Freedom on Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Method of Moment Quantile Regression Approach

“…As a result, Persson et al (2013) assert that this view of collective action theory makes sense because in an environment where corruption is the expected behavior, the likelihood of having actors with the incentive to hold corrupt officials accountable will be limited hence, institutional monitoring structures and punishment regimes would be largely ineffective. Following this line of argument, some scholars suggest that a free press is among the most effective external controls for mitigating corruption (Brunetti and Weder 2003;Camaj 2013;Hamada et al 2019;Kellam and Stein 2016;La Porta et al 1999).…”

“…Traditionally, proponents of public accountability contend that a free press is one of the main mechanisms through which the relationship between government size and corruption can be moderated (Camaj 2013; Kellam and Stein 2016). Implicit in this argument is that the press makes available information about government policies, programs, and the environment in which they are implemented, limiting the opportunities for government officials to engage in corrupt practices.…”

Anti-Media Discourse and Violence Against Journalists: Evidence From Chávez’s Venezuela

“…Presidents who confront the press rise to power in democracies facing high levels of electoral competition and challenges to institutions of representation (Kellam and Stein, 2016; Kaltwasser, 2016; Kitzberger, 2012). 4 Whether anti-media proponents are political outsiders or populist leaders, they must maintain high levels of electoral support to circumvent challenges posed by displaced elites.…”

“…4 Whether anti-media proponents are political outsiders or populist leaders, they must maintain high levels of electoral support to circumvent challenges posed by displaced elites. When the political opposition and the media fall in the same camp, incumbents have incentives to identify the media as a political villain, which leads to polarization and confrontational politics (Kellam and Stein, 2016; Conaghan and De la Torre, 2008; Kaltwasser, 2016; Kitzberger, 2012). In this context, journalists who are caught between warring partisan factions are likely to become the target of attacks (Samet, 2013; Waisbord, 2019).…”