Theories of government approval usually assume that voters care about economic outcomes. This assumption frequently does not hold. Data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems demonstrate that although the economy is often the most important issue in an election, its place on the issue agenda varies across individuals and electoral contexts. The economy is more likely to dominate other issue concerns under conditions of economic recession, volatility, and economic underdevelopment. Moreover, at the individual level the salience of economic performance rises with unemployment and economic vulnerability. Governance crises related to corruption and human rights reduce attention to the economy, as do large-scale terrorist attacks. If the economy is not perceived as important, its effect on government approval is strongly mitigated. Thus, variations in the economy’s salience need to be further incorporated into studies linking economic and political outcomes.

Theories of democratic legitimacy argue that people who believe the government is well managed and represents their interests are likely to defend the democratic status quo. Principal-agent theory predicts, however, that these same groups are also more likely to support executive actions that threaten vertical or horizontal accountability. Citizens who feel represented by an ideologically sympathetic and competent executive may be willing to delegate the president additional authority to enact their agenda, even at the expense of democratic principles. Survey data from Latin America are largely consistent with the principal-agent hypothesis; those who voted for the ruling party in the previous election or who perceive that the economy is strong say they not only like democracy and oppose coups but also support limits on critical actors and opposition parties and are willing to let the president bypass the legislature and court. Thus to understand the breakdown of democracy, we must not only examine the conditions that leave the losers of political and economic processes satisfied with the process that culminated in their defeat but also identify conditions when winners tolerate electoral and institutional challenges and are willing to protect space for public criticism.

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Economic perceptions affect incumbent support, but debate persists over whether voters focus on past or future performance and whether they view the economy in primarily sociotropic or egotropic terms. We theorize the nature of economic voting depends on context. Evidence from 18 Latin American countries 1995-2009 suggest prospective voting predominates early in the election cycle but retrospective voting gains traction as the incumbent's record mounts. Voters emphasize the national economy over personal finances except in the least developed countries. Thus the contexts in which voters are embedded not only affect the degree of economic voting but also its very nature.

This study measures support for the basic rights, liberties, and practices associated with polyarchy in 12 Latin American democracies. Specifically, it identifies five profiles of support for polyarchy’s core values and norms—public contestation, inclusive participation, limits on executive authority, and institutional checks and balances. Although citizens who fit the polyarch profile accept all of polyarchy’s principles, those who fit one of the four mixed support profiles ( power constrainer, power checker, power delegator, power restrainer) accept only some of them while rejecting other core democratic principles. Long-run factors emphasized by modernization and cultural theories (e.g., education, wealth, political engagement) are closely associated with the polyarch support profile. However, short-range performance factors (e.g., economic perceptions; crime, discrimination, and corruption victimization; voting for losing presidential candidates; presidential approval) may better explain why citizens fit one particular mixed profile over another and particularly explain willingness to delegate authority to the executive at the expense of other institutions.