Sider, the inheritance of intrinsicality, and theories of composition

Gilmore, Cody

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9424-4

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

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Two notions of fusion and the landscape of extensionality

Loss¹

2021

Philos Stud

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There are two main ways in which the notion of mereological fusion is usually defined in the current literature in mereology which have been labelled ‘Leśniewski fusion’ and ‘Goodman fusion’. It is well-known that, with Minimal Mereology as the background theory, every Leśniewski fusion also qualifies as a Goodman fusion. However, the converse does not hold unless stronger mereological principles are assumed. In this paper I will discuss how the gap between the two notions can be filled, focussing in particular on two specific sets of principles that appear to be of particular philosophical interest. The first way to make the two notions equivalent can be used to shed some interesting light on the kind of intuition both notions seem to articulate. The second shows the importance of a little-known mereological principle which I will call ‘Mild Supplementation’. As I will show, the mereology obtained by adding Mild Supplementation to Minimal Mereology occupies an interesting position in the landscape of theories that are stronger than Minimal Mereology but weaker than what Achille Varzi and Roberto Casati have labelled ‘Extensional Mereology’.

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Two notions of fusion and the landscape of extensionality

Loss¹

2021

Philos Stud

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Living without microphysical supervenience

Moran

2021

Philos Stud

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e Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience states that microphysical duplicates cannot differ in their intrinsic properties. According to Merricks (a, ), however, this thesis is false, since microphysical duplicates can differ with respect to the intrinsic property of consciousness. In my view, Merricks' argument is plausible, and extant attempts to reject it are problematic. However, the argument also threatens to make consciousness appear mysterious, by implying that consciousness facts fail to be microphysically determined and that there can be brute and inexplicable differences in consciousness between material things. e paper therefore develops an account that can respect the soundness of Merricks' argument while avoiding these problematic consequences. At the heart of the proposal is the idea that consciousness can be microphysically grounded despite failing to microphysical supervene. e proposed view also has the interesting consequence that consciousness is an intrinsic property despite depending on extrinsic factors for its instantiation.

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Composition and the cases

Bailey¹

2016

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Sider, the inheritance of intrinsicality, and theories of composition

Abstract: I defend coincidentalism (the view that some pluralities have more than one mereological fusion) and restricted composition (the view that some pluralities lack mereological fusions) against recent arguments due to Theodore Sider.

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

Two notions of fusion and the landscape of extensionality

Two notions of fusion and the landscape of extensionality

Living without microphysical supervenience

Composition and the cases

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