2021
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-021-01664-7
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Living without microphysical supervenience

Abstract: e Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience states that microphysical duplicates cannot differ in their intrinsic properties. According to Merricks (a, ), however, this thesis is false, since microphysical duplicates can differ with respect to the intrinsic property of consciousness. In my view, Merricks' argument is plausible, and extant attempts to reject it are problematic. However, the argument also threatens to make consciousness appear mysterious, by implying that consciousness facts fail to be mic… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
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“…4), deRosset (2011), Crane (2012), Sutton (2012), Korman (2015, sec. 11.3), Saenz (2015), and Moran (2022).…”
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“…4), deRosset (2011), Crane (2012), Sutton (2012), Korman (2015, sec. 11.3), Saenz (2015), and Moran (2022).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 15 The principles I am about to discuss resemble Fix in certain important ways. I have already mentioned, in 10, another principle that is somewhat like Fix (Rosen 2015, 198–99; Moran 2022, 413). There are also principles that, though rather different from Fix, are like it in that the “innards” or “content” of the facts matter; like Fix, they are principles that are sensitive to what goes on “inside” the facts doing the explaining or being explained.…”
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