Should UK Law Reconsider the Initial Threshold of Legal Personality? A Critical Analysis

Abstract

At present UK Law states that the unborn child only becomes a legal person invested with legal rights and full protections, like other human persons, at birth. This article critiques the present legal position of setting the threshold for legal personality at birth, showing its inconsistencies and fundamentally pragmatic basis. Against this background, it is argued that a principled approach towards unborn life is necessary, which reflects in law the reality that the unborn child is a type of human person deserving protection as it develops through the continuum of human personhood--from embryonic personhood, to infant personhood and ultimately into adult personhood Human personhood is defined as a union of a material and immaterial self meaning that at every stage of their development they are never a "potential person," but rather a "person with potential" even if it is not actualized through miscarriage, premature death, or disability. This moral and philosophical reasoning is what justifies protecting the sanctity of unborn life in law. The rest of the article explores and critiques the alternative static legal threshold for ascribing legal personality, at conception, implantation and viability. Having considered the practical moral, legal and philosophical problems of these alternatives; the final proposal for law reform combines all three of these thresholds in a proposal for a "dynamic" threshold for legal personality commencing at conception, which would render birth as an irrelevant threshold for moral and legal reasoning about the unborn.

Should drinking during pregnancy be criminalised to prevent fetal alcohol spectrum disorder?

“…[25] Under UK law, the fetus cannot have any rights of its own at least until it is born and has a separate existence from the mother. [26,27] Consequently, the Court of Appeal ruled that compensation should not be awarded for the damage done to the child during pregnancy because she was not a legal 'person' while in the womb. So a crime of grievous bodily harm could not have been committed against her, as a fetus is not a 'person' .…”

Baudžiamoji atsakomybė už gimusio gyvybingo vaiko sunkų sveikatos sutrikdymą dėl neatsargumo

“…24 Priklausomai nuo valstybėje egzistuojančios teorijos ar kelių teorijų sąveikos reglamentuojamas ir pradėto, bet negimusio vaiko statusas. Šiandien Lietuvoje vyrauja pro choice požiūris, kadangi įtvirtinta galimybė nutraukti nėštumą iki dvyliktos nėštumo savaitės, tuo tarpu negimusiojo statusą apibrėžia Lietuvoje egzistuojantis Žmonių palaikų laidojimo įstatymas, nustatantis žmogaus embrionų ir vaisių iki 22-osios nėštumo savaitės kremavimo ir laidojimo tvarką, pagrįstą Visuomenės sveikatos saugos reglamentu 25 . Reglamentas taikomas kaip higienos norma (1 str.)…”

“…19(2), p. 740. 25 Europos žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių konvencijos 2 straipsnį. Teismas laikosi pozicijos, jog teisės į gyvybę pradžiatai ne tik teisinis, bet ir medicininis, filosofinis, etinis ar religinis klausimas ir kad kiekviena valstybė gali turėti savas nuostatas dėl to, kas yra gyvybės pradžia 29 .…”