Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Abstract

Despite more than two decades of research on semi-presidential regimes, we still know very little about the actual coordination between the president and the prime minister. Through an in-depth analysis of Lithuanian semi-presidentialism, this article underscores the importance of institutional design on intra-executive balance of power. Drawing primarily on interviews with top-level civil servants and office-holders, it argues that in the absence of written rules or other strong norms guiding intra-executive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing their own modes of operation. Coordination depends on the initiative of the president, with ad hoc practices further weakening the position of the prime minister. While Lithuanian semi-presidentialism has functioned smoothly, the personality-centred politics commonly found in Central and East European countries create favourable conditions for presidential activism.

Lithuania: Political Developments and Data in 2021

“…However, the Constitution does not mention the European Council. During the two terms of Dalia Grybauskait ė , the President exploited the absence of formal rules and introduced the informal practice of participating in the meetings of the European Council alone (Raunio & Sedelius 2019). Naus ėda continued this practice after his election in 2019.…”

The Elephant in the Room in Presidential Politics: Informal Powers in Western Europe

“…In fact, at the begging of her first term, the approval ratings she enjoyed were incredibly high, whereas in 2006, her popular support almost halved. Until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the President insisted on being present during the European Councils together with the PM (the so -called politics of two plates) and sometimes, she did not refrain from publicly attacking the government (Raunio and Sedelius, 2019). However, in the end, the PM and cabinet prevailed, and the president was formally excluded from European affairs.…”

The Presidential Party: A Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis

“…The president must carefully manage the relationship with his or her party in order to influence both the prime minister and the composition of the cabinet, specifically through the parliamentary majority (Bucur and Cheibub, 2017). A few studies on semi-presidential regimes in Europe show these differentiated patterns in which the PP plays a crucial role (Bucur, 2017; Passarelli, 2010; Raunio and Sedelius, 2017). Thus, there may be powerful, primus inters pares or mere figurehead presidents.…”