Shareholding strategies for selling green products on online platforms in a two-echelon supply chain

Da, Ren; Guo, Rui; Lan, Yanyan; Shang, Changjing

doi:10.1016/j.tre.2021.102261

Cited by 33 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 56 publications

(75 reference statements)

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“…Guo et al [30] further examined the issue of green product R&D under competition through the case study of the fashion apparel industry. Finally, Ren et al [31] discussed the issue of green products selling on ecommerce platforms, but they did not consider the endogenous interest rate of banks, as we have done in our research.…”

Section: Government Subsidy In a Gscmentioning

confidence: 99%

Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

Shang

2021

Sustainability

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In this paper, we study the green credit financing equilibrium in a green supply chain (GSC) with government subsidy and supply uncertainty. The GSC system is composed of one manufacturer, two retailers, one bank, and the government. The manufacturer is subject to both supply uncertainty and limited capital. The manufacturer invests in the R&D of green products and borrows loans from the bank. The government subsidizes banks to encourage banks to provide loans to manufacturers with lower interest rates, which is termed “green credit financing”. The two retailers decide their order quantities with horizontal competition or horizontal cooperation. We first developed a Stackelberg model to investigate the green credit financing equilibriums (i.e., the interest rate of the bank, the manufacturer’s product green degree and wholesale price, and the retailers’ order quantity) under horizontal competition and horizontal cooperation, respectively. Subsequently, we analyzed how the subsidy interest rate, supply uncertainty, and supply correlation affect financing decisions regarding equilibrium green credit. We found that a high subsidy interest rate leads to a low interest rate of bank and the manufacturer can set a high level of green product and high wholesale price, while the retailers can set a high order quantity. Finally, we compared the green credit financing equilibriums under horizontal competition with those under horizontal cooperation using numerical and analytical methods. We found that, in general, the optimal decisions and profits of bank and SC members, consumer surplus, and social welfare under horizontal competition are higher than those under horizontal cooperation. The findings in this research could provide valuable insights for the management of capital-constrained GSCs with government subsidies and supply uncertainty in a competing market.

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Section: Government Subsidy In a Gscmentioning

confidence: 99%

Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

Shang

2021

Sustainability

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“…They discussed the pricing and production strategies of the supply chain, which found that investment by downstream firms can help reduce retail prices to increase production. Ren et al (2021) believed that the cross-shareholding strategy is optimal when both firms have low shares.…”

Section: Shareholding Strategies In Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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This article develops a new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, considers the incentive effect of the dual‐credit policy, proposes three shareholding strategies (manufacturer shareholding, retailer shareholding, and cross‐shareholding), and investigates the optimal decisions of NEV enterprises. Our results indicate that increased credit trading price, manufacturer shareholding ratio, and retailer shareholding ratio all improve NEV low‐carbon levels and manufacturer profits. In contrast, the performance of retailer profits is more complex and requires a lower range of shareholding ratio in most situations to achieve growth. Meanwhile, the cross‐shareholding strategy is the optimal choice for the manufacturer. However, the retailer only sometimes benefits from a cross‐shareholding strategy, and the manufacturer shareholding strategy can lead to the highest retailer profits in most cases. Furthermore, these findings can provide critical managerial insights for automobile enterprises and governments.

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“…Xia et al (Xia et al 2021) study the impact of cross-shareholding on the emission reduction level and firms' profits in supply chains dominated by manufacturers and retailers, respectively. Ren et al (Ren et al 2021) explore the operating mechanism behind three shareholding strategies (forward, backward, and crossshareholding) in a supplier-led green supply chain and examine companies' shareholding preferences. Different from the above studies, this paper focuses on the impact of crossshareholding on product pricing and green levels, retailers' green marketing, and corporate earnings, and designs corresponding contracts to achieve cross-shareholding supply chain coordination.…”

Section: Cross-shareholdingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of cross-shareholding under different power structures considering green investment and green marketing

Líu

Zhao

et al. 2022

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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Cross-shareholding has played an important role in strengthening strategic synergy among enterprises, but its impact on the green development of enterprises is unclear. In this paper, we construct an analytical framework that includes a manufacturer and a retailer to explore the impact of cross-shareholdings under different leaderships on green supply chain operational decisions and profits, in which the manufacturer invests in green technologies and the retailer conducts green marketing. By constructing and solving the game model of manufacturer-led and retailer-led before and after crossshareholding, it is found that after cross-shareholding, the product's green level and the retailers' marketing level are improved. For supply chain leaders, cross-shareholdings always increase their profits. Only when the follower holds the leader's shares no more than a certain value, cross-shareholding will increase the total profit of the supply chain. In addition, we obtain the optimal decisions and profits of the supply chain in the integrated situation and design two-part pricing contracts to achieve cross-shareholding supply chain coordination. The results of this paper can provide theoretical guidance and decision support for enterprises interested in using cross-shareholding to improve supply chain performance.

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Shareholding strategies for selling green products on online platforms in a two-echelon supply chain

Cited by 33 publications

References 56 publications

Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

The impact of cross-shareholding under different power structures considering green investment and green marketing

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