Shareholder coalitions, voting power, and dividend policy: New evidence from Tunisia

Guizani, Moncef; Abaoub, Ezzeddine; Kouki, Mondher

doi:10.22495/cocv6i1c4p2

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Tunisian companies' internal governance mechanism can be described as characterized by large shareholders' direct control. According to Guizani et al (2008), for a sample of 51 Tunisian companies over the period 1998-2004, the voting power of the biggest shareholder is quite high (71 percent) making him very powerful. The agency costs which arise within Tunisian companies are initiated by large shareholders desiring to dilute the wealth of minority shareholders.…”

Section: The Influence Of Ownership Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

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Outside Directors and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure

Marouan¹,

Guizani²

2015

IBR

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This study examines the nature and significance of the moderating effects of ownership and board leadership structure on the relationship between outside directors and firm performance. Using a sample of 42 non-financial Tunisian firms over the period 2004-2010, the results confirm the agency view of the positive relationship between board independence and performance. Similarly, in accordance with agency theory predictions, the results show that family ownership and CEO duality moderate negatively the outside directors-firm performance relationship. However, contrary to the predictions, institutional ownership moderates negatively that relationship. This can be explained by the substitution effect between corporate governance mechanisms. On the other hand, the largest shareholder ownership seems as a homologizer variable that influences the strength of the outside directors-firm performance relationship.

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Section: The Influence Of Ownership Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the former variable the Tunisian context is concentrated and the control is often in the hand of the first largest shareholder (Guizani et al, 2008). This variable is defined as the fraction of shares held by the largest shareholder (CONC), families (FAM) and institutional investors (INST).…”

Section: Moderated Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Outside Directors and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure

Marouan¹,

Guizani²

2015

IBR

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“…Using cross-sectional sample of Czech firms, Bena and Hanousek (2008) showed that concentrated shareholders extract private benefits at the expense of the small shareholders. For Tunisian firms, Guizani et al (2008) and Kouki and Guizani (2009) find that the voting power of the largest shareholder is associated with low payout ratios. Furthermore, firms with majority control distribute low fraction of their benefits as dividend then their counterparts with shared control.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ownership-Control Discrepancy and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Tunisia

Guizani¹,

Kouki²

2011

IBR

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This paper examines the relation between the ownership-control discrepancy and dividend policy of Tunisian firms. Using data of 44 Tunisian firms, the current study provides evidence in support of the expropriation hypothesis. The empirical results show that the largest shareholder maintains a controlling power measured by Banzhaf index in excess of his cash flow rights which, leads to a low level of dividend payout ratios. In contrast, when the control power is shared between multiple large shareholders, Tunisian firms are likely to pay large dividends.

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“…We argue that the Tunisian context offers an interesting setting in which to explore this issue. According to Guizani et al (2009) , for a sample of 51 Tunisian companies over the period 1998 -2004, the voting power of the largest shareholder is quite high (71 per cent), making him very powerful. The second and the third largest shareholders have on average 11 and 9 per cent of the voting power, respectively.…”

Section: Original Articlementioning

confidence: 99%

Does the contribution of dividend to firm value depend on controlling shareholders?

Guizani

Abaoub

2011

Int J Discl Gov

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The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects of the degree of control of large shareholders on the relation between dividend payout and fi rm value creation. From the perspective of agency theory, dividend payout is highly appreciated for fi rms subject to highly agency problems. Using a sample of 275 fi rm-years listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange over the period 1998 -2007, our results show that contrary to agency theory predictions, dividend payout of Tunisian fi rms contributes more to value creation when the fi rm has low agency confl icts. We fi nd a positive and highly coeffi cient for the payouts of fi rms with shared control and with majority fi nancial institution control. These results may be interpreted through the trust assigned by Tunisian investors to fi rms that have low agency problems. Our results also indicate a strong positive relationship between the return on assets, the level of debt and fi rm value. Finally, we document a negative relationship between the fi nancial business sector and fi rm value.

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Shareholder coalitions, voting power, and dividend policy: New evidence from Tunisia

Cited by 4 publications

References 29 publications

Outside Directors and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure

Outside Directors and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure

Ownership-Control Discrepancy and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Tunisia

Does the contribution of dividend to firm value depend on controlling shareholders?

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