Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

Bourveau, Thomas; Schoenfeld, Jordan

doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9408-0

Cited by 106 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…However, only 3 percent of their sample receives proposals, suggesting that proposals were not the primary mechanism for bringing about change in disclosure practices. Bourveau and Schoenfeld () examine how activism campaigns by hedge funds, investment advisors, and public pension funds between 2005 and 2011 affect firms' incentives to initiate voluntary disclosure of earnings and sales guidance. The authors find that firms increase voluntary disclosure when peer firms are targets of activist campaigns, and this increase helps to lower the likelihood of firms themselves being targeted by an activist campaign.…”

Section: Related Literature and The Corporate Political Spending Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure Initiation: The Case of Political Spending

Baloria

Klassen

Wiedman

2019

Contemporary Accting Res

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Demand for disclosures on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues has increased dramatically. Using corporate political spending disclosures as our setting, we conduct a detailed inquiry of 541 political spending‐related shareholder proposals from 2004 to 2012 to highlight the role of shareholder activism as a mechanism to motivate ESG disclosure. Unlike earlier studies, we examine both proposals that went to a vote and proposals that were withdrawn by the activist, allowing us to assess more comprehensively the success of shareholder activism. We find that 20 percent of firms targeted by disclosure proposals begin disclosing in the subsequent year, although implementation rates vary by proposal type—8 percent for proposals subject to a vote versus 56 percent for proposals withdrawn. The sponsor is also important: unions and public pension funds are less likely than other activists to target firms with agency problems and are less successful in having proposals withdrawn, and the implementations they obtain are viewed more negatively by the broader investor base. Our findings highlight shareholder proposals as one mechanism through which investors can successfully express their preferences for corporate disclosure policies. Given activists' long‐standing interest in environmental and social disclosure policies, we believe our findings generalize to a broader set of ESG disclosures.

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Section: Related Literature and The Corporate Political Spending Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Three percent of sample firms in that study receive shareholder proposals. Bourveau and Schoenfeld () find that when peer firms are targets of activism campaigns, firms voluntarily provide more earnings and sales guidance, and these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of future activism at these firms.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure Initiation: The Case of Political Spending

Baloria

Klassen

Wiedman

2019

Contemporary Accting Res

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“…Estudos futuros poderiam replicar os estudos aqui mencionados, para o contexto brasileiro, e, também, investigar esses mecanismos externos no Brasil, principalmente os seguintes: (i) mídia, mecanismo a que é possível ter acesso e em que se pode mensurar associações com melhores práticas de governança (Bednar, 2012;Bednar et al, 2013); (ii) ativismo dos acionistas minoritários, que tem crescido, em especial o papel do investidor institucional, em que faltam estudos que apontem as efetividades do ativismo no país (Ertimur, Ferri, & Muslu, 2011); (iii) mercado para o controle corporativo, já que, no Brasil, há algumas empresas pulverizadas, como a Vale, a BRF e a Renner, por meio das quais seria possível analisar, empiricamente, esse mecanismo; (iv) interação dos mecanismos à luz da responsabilidade social corporativa (Corbett, 2008, Jo & Harjoto, 2011, da inovação (Sapra, Subramanian, & Subramanian, 2014) e da assunção ao risco (Campbell, Ghosh, Petrova, & Sirmans, 2011;Su & Lee, 2013). Uma agenda para futuros estudos poderá ser desenvolvida pelos pesquisadores, conforme sugerido na Tabela 7.…”

Section: Considerações Finaisunclassified

Mecanismos Externos de Governança Corporativa no Brasil

Bueno¹,

Nascimento²,

Lana³

et al. 2018

CGG

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Casos de escândalo envolvendo fracas práticas de governança corporativa (GC) são destaques em vários países, especialmente no Brasil. Este artigo tem como objetivo realçar a importância dos mecanismos externos de GC e a necessidade de se desenvolver mais estudos acerca desse tema no país. Por meio do levantamento bibliométrico, com análise de 432 artigos nacionais e internacionais, no período de 1990 a 2016, foi possível verificar que, no Brasil, há apenas seis estudos que citam os mecanismos externos de GC, mas apenas um deles operacionaliza esses mecanismos empiricamente. Em contrapartida, nos Estados Unidos, na China e na Inglaterra, há um avanço nos artigos a respeito do tema, justamente pelo comprometimento com as práticas de GC das empresas. Com os achados desta pesquisa, pretendeu-se contribuir, teórica e empiricamente, com a descrição do estado da arte das pesquisas referentes aos mecanismos externos de GC no Brasil e no mundo, a síntese do papel dos mecanismos externos como ferramentas complementares da transparência e da boa GC, e a indicação de futuras possibilidades de pesquisas que aprofundem a avaliação dos mecanismos externos e da interação deles com os mecanismos internos na redução de assimetrias de informação e de interesse entre os agentes envolvidos.

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“…External communication with the capital markets is crucial for every firm because this communication is useful for facilitating efficient asset allocation and for increasing firm value (Chen et al, 2018). Moreover, information is the foundation on which traders from their beliefs about a company and ultimately their investment decisions (Bourveau & Schoenfeld, 2017). Thus, companies regularly present various form of information (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prior research shows that voluntary disclosure is important to companies, specifically its impact on investor decision-making (Glaum et al, 2011). Some views argue that companies might make a decision to disclose their information to encourage investment, to preserve company reputation (Bourveau & Schoenfeld, 2017), and to increase firm value (Ferreira & Rezende, 2007;Dhaliwal et al, 2011;Plumlee et al, 2015). Sieber et al (2014) suggest that voluntary disclosure can be considered as a relevant source of information for investors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Management Accounting disclosure, ownership structure, and firm characteristics in Indonesia manufacturing companies

Honggowati

Rahmawati

Aryani

et al. 2019

Jurnal Keuangan Dan Perbankan

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Why managers should choose to disclose their information with investors is one of the major issues in accounting research. Because of information asymmetry and the agency problem, disclosure is an important aspect of the modern capital market. This study aims to measure the extent of Strategic Management Accounting (SMA) disclosure and the impact of ownership structure (managerial ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership) and firm characteristics (firm size, leverage, profitability) on SMA practices in annual reports of Indonesia manufacturing companies. The annual reports of 545 listed companies for 2012-2016 were examined to measure the extent of SMA disclosure and investigate potential determinant factors of SMA disclosure. This study used 42 items of weighted disclosure index, based on international guideline and SMA literature. This study used multiple regression analysis to examine the association between ownership structure, firm characteristics, and SMA disclosure. The results indicate a low extent of SMA disclosure in annual reports of Indonesia manufacturing companies. The average of SMA disclosure rate is only 39.4 percent, which indicates that SMA has not been commonly disclosed in annual reports. Further results indicate that only leverage that has an insignificant effect on the extent of SMA disclosure. The finding regarding SMA disclosure in annual reports should be on concern to regulatory authorities and standard-setters in Indonesia.

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Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

Cited by 106 publications

References 57 publications

Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure Initiation: The Case of Political Spending

Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure Initiation: The Case of Political Spending

Mecanismos Externos de Governança Corporativa no Brasil

Strategic Management Accounting disclosure, ownership structure, and firm characteristics in Indonesia manufacturing companies

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