2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2018.02.011
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Shared reality through social tuning of implicit prejudice

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Cited by 12 publications
(14 citation statements)
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References 35 publications
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“…For example, if two people share the same interpretation of an event, shared reality theory proposes that discussing this shared interpretation would both enhance their connection to one another and serve to confirm their understandings of what really happened during that event. Research supports the idea that both of these motives drive shared reality: people are more likely to create shared realities with individuals with whom they are motivated to connect, such as ingroup members (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005; Echterhoff, Lang, Krämer, & Higgins, 2009; Echterhoff, Kopietz, & Higgins, 2013; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005; Skorinko & Sinclair, 2018), and about targets they are uncertain about, such as ambiguous stimuli (Echterhoff & Higgins, 2017; Kopietz, Hellmann, Higgins, & Echterhoff, 2010; Pierucci, Echterhoff, Marchal, & Klein, 2014). This work has shown that humans are motivated to create shared realities to connect with each other and make sense of the world.…”
Section: Shared Reality Theorymentioning
confidence: 81%
“…For example, if two people share the same interpretation of an event, shared reality theory proposes that discussing this shared interpretation would both enhance their connection to one another and serve to confirm their understandings of what really happened during that event. Research supports the idea that both of these motives drive shared reality: people are more likely to create shared realities with individuals with whom they are motivated to connect, such as ingroup members (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005; Echterhoff, Lang, Krämer, & Higgins, 2009; Echterhoff, Kopietz, & Higgins, 2013; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005; Skorinko & Sinclair, 2018), and about targets they are uncertain about, such as ambiguous stimuli (Echterhoff & Higgins, 2017; Kopietz, Hellmann, Higgins, & Echterhoff, 2010; Pierucci, Echterhoff, Marchal, & Klein, 2014). This work has shown that humans are motivated to create shared realities to connect with each other and make sense of the world.…”
Section: Shared Reality Theorymentioning
confidence: 81%
“…Techniques like the implicit association test (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998) and the affect misattribution procedure (Payne et al 2005), by contrast, target implicit attitudes. These measures are plausibly free from sensitivity bias, since responses are difficult to consciously misrepresent even if respondents would prefer to hide their views (Nosek 2007, though see Skorinko and Sinclair 2018). Nevertheless, a foundational assumption in the implicit attitudes literature is that implicit and explicit attitudes are fundamentally different constructs.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The classic in-group/out-group distinction relates to both relational and epistemic motives: People are less likely to desire connection with out-group members, relative to in-group members, or to trust them as a source of truth. Several studies have found that when communicating to an out-group audience (e.g., at a German institution, German students communicating to a Turkish student), participants exhibit audience tuning, but not recall bias (e.g., Echterhoff et al, 2005Echterhoff et al, , 2008; see also Skorinko & Sinclair, 2018). These results are inconsistent with a cognitive-dissonance explanation, which would predict greater dissonance (and greater attitude change) in the out-group condition (see Echterhoff et al, 2009, for an in-depth explanation).…”
Section: Sharing-is-believingmentioning
confidence: 99%