Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission

Abstract

Can an international organization socialize those who work within it? The European Commission of the European Union is a crucial case because it is an autonomous international organization with a vocation to defend supranational norms+ If this body cannot socialize its members, which international organization can? I develop theoretical expectations about how time, organizational structure, alternative processes of preference formation, and national socialization affect international socialization+ To test these expectations for the European Commission, I use two surveys of top permanent Commission officials, conducted in 1996 and 2002+ The analysis shows that support for supranational norms is relatively high, but that this is more because of national socialization than socialization in the Commission+ National norms, originating in prior experiences in national ministries, loyalty to national political parties, or experience with one's country's organization of authority, decisively shape top officials' views on supranational norms+ There are, then, several roads to international norms+ To what extent can an international organization socialize those who work within it? In order for international institutions in Europe to socialize states and state agents into international norms, they must themselves emanate these norms+ But can one simply presume that the people who work within international organizations share international norms, and if so, what are the causal mechanisms?The Commission of the European Union~hereafter the European Commission! is a crucial case for examining socialization within an international organization+

Governing at the frontier of the European commission: The case of seconded national officials

“…Like the agents temporaries ones they get one foot in the door they want to get the rest of their body through" (original emphasis). Hence, a socialisation dynamic towards supranationalism is indeed observed within the Commission, not outside it (Hooghe 2005). Secondly, the departmental statements reveal a high degree of intra-Unit and intra-DG co-ordination guided The following conditions seem to trigger a formalisation of decision-making processes among SNEs: decisions with budgetary implications, contractual issues, and routine decisions guided by standard operating procedures.…”

Instrumental calculation, cognitive role-playing, or both? Self-perceptions of seconded national experts in the European Commission

“…Second, the reduced relevance of home administrations' behavioural role expectations directly decreases the probability that such role expectations and instrumental calculations jointly affect SNE decision-making (since, obviously, one element of such tandem becomes less prevalent). Hence, our first hypothesis is: As indicated above, for current structures to override the pre-socialisation effects of previous structures requires consistency of their effects over time (Egeberg 2004;Hooghe 2005). …”

“…Being a novice -or having no prior relevance criteria to draw upon -can lead employees to be more ready to mimic old hands' behaviour and be more susceptible to a new organisation's behavioural role expectations (Johnston 2001;Hooghe 2005). As cost-benefit calculations always maintain some role in our setting, this implies that the Commission's behavioural role expectations are most likely to have decisive effects on shaping decisions of those SNEs who are novices, while the effect of instrumental cost-benefit calculations will be relatively less relevant.…”

“…Traditionally, bureaucrats' preferences or actions have often been assumed to either follow the norms and/or structural cues defining a given organisation, or to be guided by goals and cues brought by themselves to the situation (Johnston 2007;Trondal 2007). However, empirical analyses based on either approach have been, at best, inconclusive (Hooghe 2002(Hooghe , 2005Trondal 2010;Bauer 2012). Moreover, particularly in environments where 'organizational boundaries that distinguish members from nonmembers are increasingly less transparent and knowable' to all participants (Bartel and Dutton 2002: 115), the dichotomy between self-interest and socialisation is likely to become insufficient (Bauer specific conditions (Chong 2000;Hooghe 1999Hooghe , 2000Hooghe , 2002.…”

“…Moreover, as most studies of bureaucrats' identities and decision-making behaviour analyse permanent officials (Hooghe 2005(Hooghe , 2012Kassim et al 2008;Bauer 2012), it also permits the analysis of a relatively neglected group of bureaucrats (see, however, Trondal et al 2008;Trondal 2010). The findings, based on a sample of 452 SNEs, first of all show that instrumental calculation and cognitive role-playing often simultaneously define how SNEs perceive their decision-making.…”