SEROSA: SERvice oriented security architecture for Vehicular Communications

Abstract

Abstract-Modern vehicles are no longer mere mechanical devices; they comprise dozens of digital computing platforms, coordinated by an in-vehicle network, and have the potential to significantly enhance the digital life of individuals on the road. While this transformation has driven major advancements in road safety and transportation efficiency, significant work remains to be done to support the security and privacy requirements of the envisioned ecosystem of commercial services and applications (i.e., Internet access, video streaming, etc.). In the era when "service is everything and everything is a service", Vehicular Communication (VC) systems cannot escape from this ongoing trend towards multi-service environments accessible from anywhere. To meet the diverse requirements of vehicle operators and Service Providers (SPs), we present SEROSA, a service-oriented security and privacy-preserving architecture for VC. By synthesizing existing VC standards and Web Services (WS), our architecture provides comprehensive identity and service management while ensuring interoperability with existing SPs. We fully implement our system and extensively assess its efficiency, practicality, and dependability. Overall, SEROSA significantly extends the state of the art and serves as a catalyst for the integration of vehicles into the vast domain of Internet-based services.

Privacy-enhanced capabilities for VANETs using direct anonymous attestation

“…In this case, the RA coordinates with the PP, CA and Top-level CA requesting the resolution of the given pseudonym's long-term identifier (Steps 10-11) which is then disseminated to other vehicles using (for example) CRLs. However, as described in the previous section, such schemes have been shown to suffer from scalability issues [7] [9] and privacy weaknesses of varying pseudonym re-usage and revocation policies [10]; especially against scenarios where the (trusted) authorities collude with each other to link vehicles' actions or completely de-anonymize their identity.…”

“…Vehicular Communication systems are susceptible to both outsider and insider adversaries [9] [33]. The former are unauthorized entities (i.e., no credentials or trust relationships with other system entities) that seek to compromise the system and disrupt its operation.…”

“…Various properties are of interest with a particular focus on pseudonym generation, revocation and network latency; the latter can be induced by vehicular mobility so as to better assess the revocation protocol under volatile network connectivity. The goal is to provide strong evidence on the efficient provision of security-related services in vehicular networking environments against existing architectures [9] [36].…”

“…Secondly, many researchers have demonstrated the privacy weaknesses of varying pseudonym re-usage policies; even in the case of unconditional anonymity where frequently changing pseudonyms (one per message) has been proposed for a vehicle to avoid being tracked, it has been shown to be ineffective due to the timing information of changing pseudonyms [8]. Thirdly, in the context of revocation policies for removing misbehaving nodes from the network, this can only be achieved when the employed pseudonym scheme supports the resolution of participants' long-term identities from their pseudonyms [9] [10]. In this case, information about the revocation of a vehicle's longterm credentials, is disseminated to other participants through Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) or other means.…”

Secure and Privacy-Preserving Smartphone-Based Traffic Information Systems

“…The industry, academia, and standardization bodies [24], [25] have converged to the use of pseudonymous authentication for protecting the location privacy of vehicles [24], [26]- [31]. These ephemeral identities are public/private key pairs, used for identifying and authenticating vehicles both in the context of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications [32].…”