2017 IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC) 2017
DOI: 10.1109/vnc.2017.8275615
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Privacy-enhanced capabilities for VANETs using direct anonymous attestation

Abstract: Abstract-In this paper, we propose a novel secure and privacypreserving solution for V2X systems leveraging widely accepted trusted computing technologies. Our approach systematically addresses all key aspects, i.e., security, privacy and accountability (revocation). By reflecting on state-of-the-art pseudonym architectures, we identify their limitations focusing on pseudonym reusage policies and revocation mechanisms. We propose the use of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) algorithms to enhance existing V2X … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
2

Citation Types

0
41
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
5
2

Relationship

4
3

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 33 publications
(41 citation statements)
references
References 26 publications
0
41
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The PUCA architecture builds upon the C2C-CC pseudonym scheme and the REWIRE revocation protocol by using anonymous credentials between vehicles and pseudonym certificate authorities to provide 'full anonymity for honest users' [32]. In further developments, Direct Anonymous Attestation (based on group signatures) has been applied to remove the pseudonym certificate authority altogether by allowing vehicles to generate their own pseudonyms [33]. Both REWIRE and PUCA assume that the vehicle trusted computing platform cannot be compromised, and that the vehicle computer will reliably deliver revocation messages to the trusted platform, as they decentralise trust from the certificate authorities to the vehicles.…”
Section: B Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The PUCA architecture builds upon the C2C-CC pseudonym scheme and the REWIRE revocation protocol by using anonymous credentials between vehicles and pseudonym certificate authorities to provide 'full anonymity for honest users' [32]. In further developments, Direct Anonymous Attestation (based on group signatures) has been applied to remove the pseudonym certificate authority altogether by allowing vehicles to generate their own pseudonyms [33]. Both REWIRE and PUCA assume that the vehicle trusted computing platform cannot be compromised, and that the vehicle computer will reliably deliver revocation messages to the trusted platform, as they decentralise trust from the certificate authorities to the vehicles.…”
Section: B Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…IFAL defines a certificate change strategy that is less susceptible to impersonation attacks [34] than the C2C-CC pseudonym certificate pooling approach [24] adopted by the US standards [6]. Lastly, IFAL retains the centralised control over vehicle revocation which is lost by some of the more privacy-friendly and less standards-compliant architectures [32], [33].…”
Section: B Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Six decades since the start of the computer revolution, four decades since the invention of the micro-processor, and two decades into the rise of modern Internet, all of the technology required to transform industries through software has finally matured and can be widely delivered at a global scale. No part of the industry is untouched by this transformation; be it automotive [1], [2], smart factories, smart grids [3] or healthcare [4]. And with the advent of Internet of Things (IoT), we have just begun reaping the benefits of this evolution that, however, also brings a number of new challenges (or rather makes old unsolved challenges urgent to be tackled with); with security, resilience and operational assurance being some of the major concerns at both logical extremes of a network, namely the edge and the cloud.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A key component in building such trusted computing systems is a highly secure anchor (either software-or hardwarebased) that can serve as root-of-trust towards providing cryptographic functions, measuring and reporting the behaviour of the running software, and computing platform, and storing data securely. Prominent examples include Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs like TrustZone) [8], Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) [2] or more lightweight secure components that require minimal hardware features and assumptions (better suited to operate in resource-constrained devices) such as SMART, Intel's TrustLite [9] and ARM's TrustZone-M.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When referring to ad delivery and targeted ad placement, we are not only referring to smartphones, smart homes or smart appliances but to the wider spectrum of IoT applications; e.g., Intelligent Transportation Systems [5,6]. Such smart vehicles and respectively their drivers, will be part of such aggressive data collection methods being utilized by advertising networks.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%