Serial Communication Protocol With Enhanced Properties–Securing Communication Layer for Smart Sensors Applications

Dudak, Juraj; Gašpar, Gabriel; Sedivy, Stefan; Fabo, Peter; Pepucha, Lubomir; Tanuška, Pavol

doi:10.1109/jsen.2018.2874898

Cited by 24 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Dudak et al [37] described enhancement of features of serial Modbus protocol. ey developed uBUS protocol by adding some of the protocol specific features.…”

Section: Existing Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol

Rajesh

Satyanarayana

2021

Security and Communication Networks

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Industrial control systems (ICS) are being used for surveillance and controlling numerous industrial process plants in national critical infrastructures. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system is a core component in ICS systems for continuous monitoring and controlling these process plants. Legacy SCADA systems are working in isolated networks and using proprietary communication protocols which made them less exposed to cyber threats. In recent times, these ICS systems have been connected to Internet and corporate networks for data sharing and remote monitoring. They are also using open protocols and operating systems. This leads to vulnerabilities of the system to cyberattacks. Cybersecurity threats are more prevalent than ever in ICS systems. These attacks may be external or internal. Modbus is a widely deployed communication protocol for SCADA communications. There is no security in design of Modbus protocol, and it is vulnerable to numerous cyberattacks. In this paper, we worked for False Command Injection attack, False Access Injection attack, and replay attacks on Modbus protocol. Initially, a real-time SCADA testbed was set up, and we envisaged the impact of these attacks on Modbus protocol data using the testbed. In this work, we used local area network (LAN) environment only for simulating the attacks. We assumed that the attacks penetrated the LAN network. We proposed and developed (a) a method to detect replay attacks by incorporating time stamp and sequence number in Modbus communications and (b) a frame filtering module which will block unauthorized attacks like False Command Injection and False Access Injection attacks to reach programmable logic controller (PLC). Numbers of attacks were simulated and the performance of the method was measured using attack block rate (ABR). It blocked 97% of malicious Modbus transactions or attacks to reach the PLC. It protects SCADA systems from attackers, which is a core component of industrial control systems. The solution enhanced the security of SCADA systems with Modbus protocol.

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“…Dudak et al [37] described enhancement of features of serial Modbus protocol. ey developed uBUS protocol by adding some of the protocol specific features.…”

Section: Existing Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol

Rajesh

Satyanarayana

2021

Security and Communication Networks

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“…While not specific to E-IoT, research in serial-based communication defense mechanisms may apply to E-IoT. Studies by Dudak et al [271], and Wilson et al [272] provide insight into securing serialbased protocols and considerations that must be taken to design protocols securely. Further, as standardization may help secure serial-based communication in ICS, the IEEE 1711.2 working group's efforts have focused on creating the Secure SCADA communications protocol [273].…”

Section: Mitigation Of Communication Layer Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Survey on Enterprise Internet-of-Things Systems (E-IoT): A Security Perspective

Rondon¹,

Babun²,

Arış³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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As technology becomes more widely available, millions of users worldwide have installed some form of smart device in their homes or workplaces. These devices are often off-theshelf commodity systems, such as Google Home or Samsung SmartThings, that are installed by end-users looking to automate a small deployment. In contrast to these "plug-and-play" systems, purpose-built Enterprise Internet-of-Things (E-IoT) systems such as Crestron, Control4, RTI, Savant offer a smart solution for more sophisticated applications (e.g., complete lighting control, A/V management, security). In contrast to commodity systems, E-IoT systems are usually closed source, costly, require certified installers, and are overall more robust for their use cases. Due to this, E-IoT systems are often found in expensive smart homes, government and academic conference rooms, yachts, and smart private offices. However, while there has been plenty of research on the topic of commodity systems, no current study exists that provides a complete picture of E-IoT systems, their components, and relevant threats. As such, lack of knowledge of E-IoT system threats, coupled with the cost of E-IoT systems has led many to assume that E-IoT systems are secure. To address this research gap, raise awareness on E-IoT security, and motivate further research, this work emphasizes E-IoT system components, E-IoT vulnerabilities, solutions, and their security implications. In order to systematically analyze the security of E-IoT systems, we divide E-IoT systems into four layers: E-IoT Devices Layer, Communications Layer, Monitoring and Applications Layer, and Business Layer. We survey attacks and defense mechanisms, considering the E-IoT components at each layer and the associated threats. In addition, we present key observations in state-of-the-art E-IoT security and provide a list of open research problems that need further research.

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“…The structure of the data part is described in the following section. Figure 4: The address space for sensor probes was defined in the width of 2 16 of unique addresses. To describe the structure and format of the sent data, 1Byte (TYPE) was reserved.…”

Section: Link Layer Communication Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When implementing the cryptographic algorithm for data acquisition systems [16,17], the means of communication must be taken into account. In a one-way communication, the use of symmetric encryption is the optimal choice.…”

Section: Rf Transmission Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementation of Secure Communication via the RF Module for Data Acquisition

2019

Self Cite

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Wireless monitoring systems are currently a common part of both industrial and domestic solutions. In case of industrial use, it may be a sensory system at a point where it is not possible to implement a fixed line, or it is necessary to repeatedly change the position, respectively, the location of the measuring probes. This is, in particular, the monitoring of environmental parameters (temperature, humidity) in bulk materials, biomass, or agricultural crops in storage facilities. For domestic use, local weather devices and systems are part of smart households such as lock control (entrance gate, apartment entrance), light control, and HVAC control. Devices that utilize wireless technology for communication include IoT devices as well. This article describes the use of the VirtualWire communication protocol using radio frequency waves with a carrier frequency of 433MHz-900MHz. The main topic of the article is the design and implementation of a secure one-way communication channel. Such a solution consists of a transmitting device with implemented desired sensors and a receiving device that aggregates data from multiple transmitters.

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Serial Communication Protocol With Enhanced Properties–Securing Communication Layer for Smart Sensors Applications

Cited by 24 publications

References 15 publications

Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol

Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol

Survey on Enterprise Internet-of-Things Systems (E-IoT): A Security Perspective

Implementation of Secure Communication via the RF Module for Data Acquisition

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