Sense-making under ignorance

Johnson, Samuel G. B.; Rajeev‐Kumar, Greeshma; Keil, Frank C.

doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2016.06.004

Cited by 47 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…These results demonstrate that children as young as 4 have a robust latent scope bias, placing weight on some of the same explanatory virtues as adults (e.g. Johnson et al ., ; Khemlani et al ., ).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The preference for the 2‐ over the 3‐effect explanation demonstrates that children have a preference for narrow latent scope – explanations that do not make unverified predictions (Khemlani et al ., ). Although the wide manifest scope preference is consistent with maximizing posterior probability, the narrow latent scope preference is not: Children have no direct evidence one way or another regarding whether the latent effect occurred, so they have equal posteriors (Johnson et al ., ). Thus, children seek explanatory virtues even when probability information does not discern between the two options.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…whether the pig's tail was curly or straight) in Experiment 2, they consistently preferred explanations that lined up with their inferences about the unknown features. This provides some initial evidence that children's latent scope bias (demonstrated in Experiment 1) may be driven by the same two explanatory processes as adults’ latent scope bias: inferred evidence and manifest scope (Johnson et al ., ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…To further investigate whether children are influenced both by explanatory virtues and probabilistic information, we capitalized on an explanatory bias shown by adults: The latent scope bias , wherein explanations that make fewer unverified or latent predictions are preferred (Johnson, Rajeev‐Kumar & Keil, , ; Khemlani, Sussman & Oppenheimer, ). For example, imagine that your car smelled like antifreeze, and this could be due to one of two equally common problems – a problem with the cooling system or a problem with the exhaust.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This inference in adults appears to result from a combination of two explanatory processes (Johnson et al ., , ): inferred evidence and manifest scope .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Little Bayesians or little Einsteins? Probability and explanatory virtue in children's inferences

Johnston

Johnson

Koven

et al. 2016

Developmental Science

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Like scientists, children seek ways to explain causal systems in the world. But are children scientists in the strict Bayesian tradition of maximizing posterior probability? Or do they attend to other explanatory considerations, as laypeople and scientists - such as Einstein - do? Four experiments support the latter possibility. In particular, we demonstrate in four experiments that 4- to 8-year-old children, like adults, have a robust latent scope bias that leads to inferences that do not maximize posterior probability. When faced with two explanations equally consistent with observed data, where one explanation makes an unverified prediction, children consistently preferred the explanation that does not make this prediction (Experiment 1), even if the prior probabilities are identical (Experiment 3). Additional evidence suggests that this latent scope bias may result from the same explanatory strategies used by adults (Experiments 1 and 2), and can be attenuated by strong prior odds (Experiment 4). We argue that children, like adults, rely on 'explanatory virtues' in inference - a strategy that often leads to normative responses, but can also lead to systematic error.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This inference in adults appears to result from a combination of two explanatory processes (Johnson et al ., , ): inferred evidence and manifest scope .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Little Bayesians or little Einsteins? Probability and explanatory virtue in children's inferences

Johnston

Johnson

Koven

et al. 2016

Developmental Science

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Reasoning

Khemlani

2018

Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience

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Reasoning concerns the cognitive processes by which people draw conclusions from the salient, meaningful pieces of information that they comprehend or observe. Reasoning processes are challenging to investigate because both their initiation and their final product (the inference) can be nonverbal and unconscious. This chapter summarizes recent developments in the science of reasoning. It briefly reviews the differences between “core” patterns of inference, that is, deduction, induction, and abduction: Deductions are inferences that are true in those cases in which the premises are true. Inductions concern all other sorts of reasoning. And abductions are special types of inductions that yield explanatory hypotheses. The chapter then addresses three fundamental debates that engage contemporary reasoning researchers. The first addresses how to separate rational from irrational deductions. The second concerns the relation between deduction and induction. And the third focuses on how people create explanations. The chapter concludes by addressing ways of making progress to a general, unified account of higher‐level reasoning.

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Explanatory completeness

Korman

Khemlani

2020

Acta Psychologica

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Sense-making under ignorance

Cited by 47 publications

References 44 publications

Little Bayesians or little Einsteins? Probability and explanatory virtue in children's inferences

Little Bayesians or little Einsteins? Probability and explanatory virtue in children's inferences

Reasoning

Explanatory completeness

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