2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2020.103139
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Cited by 19 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…If the evidence includes observations, A, B, and C, then the generation process will involve memory search for causes and analogies related to A, B, and C. Indeed, we know that causal relationships act as stronger retrieval cues than non-causal relationships with equally strong associative strength (Fenker, Waldmann, & Holyoak, 2005). Plausibly, the narrative would be built up until it is deemed a sufficiently complete explanation (Korman & Khemlani, 2020).…”
Section: R42 Objection 5: Cnt's Representational Framework Is Too Sim...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If the evidence includes observations, A, B, and C, then the generation process will involve memory search for causes and analogies related to A, B, and C. Indeed, we know that causal relationships act as stronger retrieval cues than non-causal relationships with equally strong associative strength (Fenker, Waldmann, & Holyoak, 2005). Plausibly, the narrative would be built up until it is deemed a sufficiently complete explanation (Korman & Khemlani, 2020).…”
Section: R42 Objection 5: Cnt's Representational Framework Is Too Sim...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our research may also further some debates surrounding the mental model theory of human reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983;Johnson-Laird et al, 2015), which is often portrayed as a competitor to the new paradigm (e.g., Elqayam, 2018;Over, 2009). In the context of the mental model theory, the term explanation is closely linked to causal reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Khemlani, 2017;Khemlani et al, 2014;Korman & Khemlani, 2020). We did not restrict our model to causal explanations, but we agree with Korman and Khemlani (2020) that explanation is often causal.…”
Section: Contributions and Future Researchmentioning
confidence: 67%
“…The knowledge that books can be heavy and shelves flimsy enables individuals to simulate the situation in which the weight of a book causes a shelf to break. Reasoners appear to prefer a complete causal simulation from the initial cause to the final effect in the scenario, and in which each effect has a cause (Johnson-Laird et al, 2004; Korman & Khemlani, 2018, 2020; Zemla et al, 2017). On learning that the book was not put on the shelf, reasoners can halt the simulation, and, as a consequence, cease to believe that the subsequent events occurred in the chain.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%