Self‐Motion and Cognition: Plato's Theory of the Soul

Abstract

I argue that Plato believes that the soul must be both the principle of motion and the subject of cognition because it moves things specifically by means of its thoughts. I begin by arguing that the soul moves things by means of such acts as examination and deliberation and that this view is developed in response to Anaxagoras. I then argue that every kind of soul enjoys a kind of cognition, with even plant souls having a form of Aristotelian discrimination (krisis), and that there is therefore no completely unintelligent, evil soul in the cosmos that can explain disorderly motions; as a result, the soul is not the principle of all motion but only motion in the cosmos after it has been ordered by the Demiurge.

Does the Universe Perceive? On Cosmic Perception in the Timaeus

“…The first piece of evidence that leads one to suspect that the World Soul has aisthēsis is a passage about the World Soul's cognition, wherein the World Soul is said to produce doxai kai pisteis in relation to what is perceptible (peri to 1 To my knowledge, Reydams-Schils' 'Plato's World Soul: Grasping Sensibles without Sense-Perception' (1997) is the only paper explicitly and exclusively devoted to this question: as the title readily suggests, it comes to conclusions which are very different from mine. Most recent scholars, like Corcilius (2018), who in turn relies on Reydams-Shields, and Campbell (2021) deny that the World Soul has perception. seems to have entertained a view compatible with mine, and is quoted approvingly by Johansen's (draft).…”

Unveiling Ethical Implications: AI Robot Accountability in Islamic Context

“…Aristotle (384-322 BC), in his book On the Soul, in which he discussed and criticized the understanding of the soul before him, briefly states the following for the understanding of the ancient soul: Each of the qualifications is linked to the principles set. 43 Philosophers who accept only one cause and only one principle, such as fire or air, also argue that the soul is composed of a single principle. However, those who accept a multiplicity of principles put the multiplicity in its composition.…”