Self-interest and public funding of education

Soares, Jorge

doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00183-9

Cited by 24 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…6 In this model economy, unlike in Soares (2003), without altruism there is no support for public funding of education. For low levels of altruism, parents care little about their children and prefer very low levels of public investment on education.…”

Section: Figure 1 About Herementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Soares (2003), I show that in an economy without altruism, because of borrowing constraints and the presence of factor complementarities in the production function, agents that will get a relatively large fraction of their income from the return on their investments in physical capital support public funding of education. The complementarity between physical capital and labor implies that when the labor input increases, the return on capital goes up.…”

Section: The Benchmark Economymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The presence of general equilibrium effects plays a critical role in the findings in Soares (2003 and2004). Physical and human capital are assumed to be complements in the economy's aggregate production function.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the political economy of public education

Soares

2006

J Popul Econ

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The primary objective of this paper is to highlight the distinct roles of altruism and of self-interest in the political determination of a public education policy. I assess the relative importance of three factors in the determination of the equilibrium level of this policy: altruism, the impact of public funding of education on social security benefits and its impact on factor prices.I then focus on the impact of implementing a social security system on the equilibrium levels of education funding and on welfare. I find that although, in the benchmark economy, the presence of social security might generate support for public funding of education, its overall effect on the well-being of individuals is negative for any level of social security taxation.JEL Classification: D78, E62, I22.

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Section: Figure 1 About Herementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Benchmark Economymentioning

confidence: 99%

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A dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the political economy of public education

Soares

2006

J Popul Econ

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“…Many citizens who do definitely not directly gain from an education subsidy nevertheless vote for some public spending. These individuals might indirectly benefit from increased aggregate human capital because it positively affects the earnings of the uneducated (Creedy and Francois, 1990), the return on capital (Soares, 2003), and the tax base and thus the financial means for redistributive measures (Beviá and Iturbe-Ormaetxe, 2002). So the education subsidy should be positive in the pre-expansion periods.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution of public spending on higher education in a democracy

Haupt

2012

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…This work is related to three strands of literature on: a) human capital accumulation as an engine of growth (Azariadis-Drazen, 1990); b) alternative ways of financing education (Epple-Romano, 1998, Meier, 2000, Soares, 2003; c) widespread public provision and financing of education as a way to indoctrinate and instill social norms and values e.g reducing the rent-seeking incentives between competitive groups of heterogeneous agents (Gradstein-Justman, 2000, 2005.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Education policy, growth and welfare

Benos

2008

Education Economics

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This paper studies the general equilibrium implications of two types of education policy in an overlapping generations model. We examine vouchers, which augment inherited private education spending, and public investment on economy-wide human capital, that provides externalities to individual human capital accumulation.The government determines jointly the tax rate and the allocation of tax revenues among the two types of education policy. The optimal division of public spending between the education policy instruments and the associated tax rate depend on the elasticities of human capital accumulation with regard to vouchers and public investment on economy-wide human capital.

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Self-interest and public funding of education

Cited by 24 publications

References 23 publications

A dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the political economy of public education

A dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the political economy of public education

The evolution of public spending on higher education in a democracy

Education policy, growth and welfare

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