Selectorate theory and the democratic peacekeeping hypothesis: evidence from Fiji and Bangladesh

Levin, Jamie; MacKay, Joseph; Nasirzadeh, Abouzar

doi:10.1080/13533312.2015.1108845

Cited by 21 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 0 publications

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“…The main empirical finding challenges prior claims that peacekeeping has destabilizing effects or reinforces illiberal governance (Savage & Caverley, 2014;Levin et al, 2016). Rather, the evidence suggests that participation in UN peacekeeping reduces coups, the most overt type of military interference, and that it may have positive effects for longer-term democratization.…”

Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 56%

“…For example, Savage & Caverley (2014) argue that peacekeeping service abroad enhances ‘training, operational experience, and confidence’, which may shift the civil–military power balance, increasing the probability of political instability. A similar logic is laid out in Levin et al (2016: 117), who draw on case evidence from Bangladesh and Fiji to support an argument that external military funding strengthens military independence, with destabilizing consequences: ‘The result of a newly empowered and emboldened military may be a coup’. Analyzing the long-term implications of participation, Levin et al (2016: 107) also suggest that ‘autocratic states may take on peacekeeping duties as a way of maintaining costly security apparatuses for the purposes of domestic repression’ and that peacekeeping ‘risks becoming a means to facilitate illiberal domestic governance in the developing world’.…”

Section: The Effect Of Peacekeeping Participation On Troop-contributimentioning

confidence: 73%

“…The reimbursements they receive from the UN typically exceed their costs (Gaibulloev et al, 2015). 3 In a given TCC, the beneficiaries of economic benefits may include the national government, military institutions, individual militaries, and private firms (Bellamy & Williams, 2013), but in a typical case, the military is the main beneficiary (Levin et al, 2016; Zaman & Biswas, 2014).…”

Section: The Logic Of Peacekeeping Dependency Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What are the consequences for the political stability of contributing states? Oddly neglected in conventional peacekeeping research, these questions are at the center of an emergent literature on participation effects (Sotomayor, 2013; Levin et al, 2016; Savage & Caverley, 2014; Zaman & Biswas, 2014; Dwyer, 2015). In this literature, there is consensus that peacekeeping service abroad affects civil–military relations at home, but the nature and direction of the effect remains in dispute: claims that participation reduces military insubordination stand against claims that it contributes to instability or illiberal entrenchment.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The contribution of the study is three-fold. First, the study presents new empirical findings that throw into doubt claims that participation in UN peacekeeping has destabilizing effects or facilitates illiberal governance (Levin et al, 2016; Savage & Caverley, 2014). While my data suggest that the effect varies across countries, and especially with the size of economic incentives, there is no evidence of a systematic and destabilizing effect, nor of authoritarian entrenchment.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Backdoor peacekeeping

Lundgren

2018

Journal of Peace Research

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I advance and test a theoretical argument of how participation in UN peacekeeping affects the likelihood of coup attempts in troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The argument highlights the interplay between the economic incentives of militaries in poor TCCs and the UN’s preference for contributors with stable civil–military relations. Fearing the loss of UN reimbursement funds, militaries for which such funds are important will avoid visible acts of military insubordination, such as coup attempts, that would place their future participation in UN peacekeeping at risk. I test this proposition against time-series cross-sectional data on 157 countries in the 1991–2013 period using panel regression and matching. The data show that countries where the armed forces are more dependent on peacekeeping revenues experience fewer coup attempts than comparable peers, even when taking coup-proofing measures and other alternative explanations into account. I also find that the coup-restraining effect is only observed in periods where member states contribute enough troops to award the UN a real choice over alternative contributors. The study introduces a novel theoretic logic, presents empirical results at odds with the existing literature, and suggests important policy implications with regard to UN vetting and standards for troop-contributing countries.

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Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 56%

Section: The Effect Of Peacekeeping Participation On Troop-contributimentioning

confidence: 73%