Backdoor peacekeeping

Abstract

I advance and test a theoretical argument of how participation in UN peacekeeping affects the likelihood of coup attempts in troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The argument highlights the interplay between the economic incentives of militaries in poor TCCs and the UN’s preference for contributors with stable civil–military relations. Fearing the loss of UN reimbursement funds, militaries for which such funds are important will avoid visible acts of military insubordination, such as coup attempts, that would place their future participation in UN peacekeeping at risk. I test this proposition against time-series cross-sectional data on 157 countries in the 1991–2013 period using panel regression and matching. The data show that countries where the armed forces are more dependent on peacekeeping revenues experience fewer coup attempts than comparable peers, even when taking coup-proofing measures and other alternative explanations into account. I also find that the coup-restraining effect is only observed in periods where member states contribute enough troops to award the UN a real choice over alternative contributors. The study introduces a novel theoretic logic, presents empirical results at odds with the existing literature, and suggests important policy implications with regard to UN vetting and standards for troop-contributing countries.

Sticking it out: Instability, regime type, and personnel withdrawals from UN peacekeeping operations

“…Similar to Levin (2019), we find that peacekeeper deaths yield larger withdrawals. Also, Member-States Deployed reveals that as the number of countries contributing increases, individual withdrawals increase, supporting collective action problem arguments in the literature (Passmore et al, 2018). The Deployment Duration variables reveal duration dependence.…”

“…Next, we code the monthly number of states deployed to each PKO with Member-States Deployed . Following work on member-state unwillingness to deploy forces as the number of contributors rises (Passmore et al, 2018), we expect deployed states to shirk by removing personnel as the number of participating states increases. We also include variables for time effects for a state's deployment.…”

“…Since more PKO personnel can more capably improve stability (Hultman et al, 2013, 2014), knowing what factors motivate contributions is an essential part of understanding peacekeeping outcomes. Research suggests complexity in deployment motives, including financial incentives (Gaibulloev et al, 2009; Passmore et al, 2018) and strategic considerations, such as trade interests (Stojek and Tir, 2014), security concerns (Kathman and Melin, 2017; Uzonyi, 2015), or interests in obtaining a seat on the UNSC (Bullion, 1997).…”

“…While non-democracies do not acquire the same outcome benefits, they gain substantial process benefits associated with their militaries, like field experience and equipment training. Also, personnel reimbursements have helped non-democracies fund domestic repression (Levin et al, 2016), gain reputation and resource benefits to entrench their power (Duursma and Gledhill, 2019), advance the military's role in domestic politics (Cunliffe, 2018), and address foreign (Kathman and Melin, 2017) and domestic security interests (Lundgren, 2018).…”

Only as fast as its troop contributors: Incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the UN’s peacekeeping response

“…Qualitative evidence suggests that reimbursements matter for some states. A former Fijian Army Chief of Staff acknowledged that sending peacekeepers abroad has become ‘[t]he whole purpose of the Fiji military’ (Reuters, 2014), while Lundgren (2018) cites similar motivations expressed by Indonesia, Malawi, Senegal, Bangladesh, and Ghana. Even TCCs that do not directly profit from UN reimbursements may appreciate them as a way of funding deployment bonuses for their troops or securing other benefits of peacekeeping participation (e.g.…”