Selection of public servants into politics

Abstract

Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include incompatibility and ineligibility rules due to concerns about conflicts of interest and the politicization of the public service. We study how these rules affect the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates for public servants and thus the selection into politics. We compile a novel dataset that captures the fraction of public servants in 71 national legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there are 7 percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments where a strict regime is in force. Supplementary evidence shows that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively correlated with government consumption as well as the absence of corruption.

Public Employees as Politicians: Evidence from Close Elections

“…This is likely to obfuscate the separation of powers between the executive and the democratically-chosen political branches of the local government (Braendle and Stutzer 2016). A public sector employee politician may also have a variety of ways to target public spending to certain voters, such as her own political constituency or interest group (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 2000).…”

“…If that was the case, spending could also decrease (remain unchanged) if the status quo level of per capita spending is too high (optimal) from the social point of view. Municipal employees may also be relatively immune to specific business interests and lobbying (Braendle and Stutzer 2016), which may reduce inefficient spending to public procurement.…”

“…In this case, municipal employees ought to increase spending also in sectors other than their own sector of employment. Moreover, while the expertise of municipal employees can also be useful for the efficient provision of public services (Braendle and Stutzer 2016), it is unlikely that, holding citizens' needs constant, such efficient provision systematically calls for greater spending, especially only in their own sector.…”

“…In both cases, the public sector employees can possibly exert disproportionate influence in the council due to their information advantage over the other councilors on the true costs and benefits of providing public services in their sector of employment (Niskanen 1971;Romer and Rosenthal 1979). This disproportionate influence may compromise the political neutrality of public service and also undermine the separation powers more generally (Braendle and Stutzer 2016). 1 For example, Braendle and Stutzer (2016) report that in their sample of 76 countries the average fraction of politicians in national parliaments with a public sector background is 31.3%.…”

“…This disproportionate influence may compromise the political neutrality of public service and also undermine the separation powers more generally (Braendle and Stutzer 2016). 1 For example, Braendle and Stutzer (2016) report that in their sample of 76 countries the average fraction of politicians in national parliaments with a public sector background is 31.3%.…”