Selbstverwaltung im Betrieb

Hardwig, Thomas; Jäger, Wieland

doi:10.1007/978-3-322-83987-9

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Not surprising and consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Hammer/Stern 1980, Hardwig/Jäger 1991, in all three companies the employee-owners delegated a remarkable amount of their power to the company management. However, the modi of power delegation were rather different and had some distinctive consequences.…”

Section: Propositions and Discussionsupporting

confidence: 89%

“…Hettlage 1987). This idea, however, does also include several caveats, for instance the development and organization of the company organs and the rules of power distribution (Hardwig/Jäger 1991;Niehues 1994). Moreover, it will be challenged by the opposition of powerful actors (e.g.…”

Section: Propositions and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From the employee perspective, given the indirect form of democracy that is constitutive for most EOCs, it seems necessary to renounce to a certain extent on accomplishing individual interests (Hardwig/Jäger 1991). Instead special focus lies on the development and organization of the company organs (Niehues 1994) and of special arrangements with management (Wright et al 2002).…”

Section: Eo and Power -A General Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, this does not imply that power relations and processes would definitively remain unchanged: Several common conflicts, namely employee dismissals or profit sharing, will become considerably altered by EO (Buck et al 2003;Rousseau/Shperling 2003). As a consequence, problem solving mechanisms need to be reshaped (Hardwig/Jäger 1991). Kuvaas (2003) also notes that the perceived fairness of the EO introduction would affect the future development of the whole concept.…”

Section: Eo and Power -A General Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The Power of Participation? Power Relations and Processes in Employee-owned Companies

Steger

Hartz

2008

German Journal of Human Resource Management: Zeitschrift für Pe

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Introducing employee participation in a company can be expected to change the power relations and the power processes within the organization. This is particularly true when the majority ownership of a company moves into the hand of its employees. Drawing on three case studies of East German companies this paper describes how the introduction of employee ownership interrelates with power relations and processes in the company. Moreover, some overarching patterns were derived from the analysis finally resulting in seven propositions about how employee ownership and power are linked to each other. Die Macht der Partizipation? Machtbeziehungen und Machtprozesse in Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligungs-Unternehmen Die Einführung von Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligung in einem Unternehmen lässt in der Regel auch die Machtverhältnisse und Machtprozesse innerhalb der Organisation nicht unberührt. Das gilt insbesondere in jenen Fällen, wo die Mehrheit der Unternehmensanteile in die Hände der Mitarbeiter übergeht. Auf der Grundlage von drei Fallstudien in ostdeutschen Unternehmen wird beschrieben, in welchem Interaktionsverhältnis die Einführung von Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligung und die Machtverhältnisse und-strukturen in den betroffenen Unternehmen stehen. Darüber hinaus werden firmenübergreifende Muster herausgearbeitet, die in sieben Thesen über das Verhältnis zwischen Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligung und Macht münden.

show abstract

Section: Propositions and Discussionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Section: Propositions and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Eo and Power -A General Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Eo and Power -A General Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Power of Participation? Power Relations and Processes in Employee-owned Companies

Steger

Hartz

2008

German Journal of Human Resource Management: Zeitschrift für Pe

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Even some different long-term studies found no significant correlation between ESO, work satisfaction and commitment (Long, 1978(Long, , 1982Keef, 1998). Kuvaas (2003: 205) sums up: "[T]he idea that ownership in itself, should either automatically or directly generate commitment, seems overly behaviouristic and naïve" (similar Hardwig and Jäger, 1991).…”

Section: On the Way To The Firm Community -Eso As A Means To Develop mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Employee as the Unknown Actor? A Discourse Analysis of the Employee Share Ownership Debate with Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe

Kranz

Steger

Hartz³

2016

Organizacija

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Background and purpose: Although employee share ownership (ESO) deserves of a long tradition, we still know little about employees’ perspectives about ESO. The lack of knowledge about the employees’ attitudes towards ESO is discursively filled in the ESO debate. This paper challenges that deficit by carrying out a semantic analysis of the literature with the aim to identify the various actor constructions used implicitly in the ESO discourse. Design/Methodology/Approach: We conduct a semantic analysis of the ESO discourse. To unfold the order of this discourse we draw on the distinction between surface and underlying structure of communication in the sense of Michel Foucault. We interpret some semantic lead differences, a term coined by Niklas Luhmann, to constitute the underlying structure of communication. Results: We can identify six different streams on the ESO discourse’s surface level each defined by the ends pursued. The discourse’s underlying structure is made up of the distinctions production-consumption, capital-labour, and ownership-control that also determine the actor models implicitly in use. Conclusion: We can identify five different actor models implicit in the ESO discourse. While the CEE discourse differs on the surface level in as far as it is more concerned with questions of political legitimation of the privatisation process than with questions of economic efficiency, thus introducing political distinctions in the discourse rather missing in the west, it shares the underlying semantic lead differences with the Western discourse as well as the actor models anchored in those differences.

show abstract

Interessenmanagement — Loyalität, Widerspruch und Abwanderung transnationaler Unternehmen

Zündorf¹

2001

Reorganisationsstrategien in Wirtschaft Und Verwaltung

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Selbstverwaltung im Betrieb

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

The Power of Participation? Power Relations and Processes in Employee-owned Companies

The Power of Participation? Power Relations and Processes in Employee-owned Companies

The Employee as the Unknown Actor? A Discourse Analysis of the Employee Share Ownership Debate with Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe

Interessenmanagement — Loyalität, Widerspruch und Abwanderung transnationaler Unternehmen

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About