Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East

Tal, David

doi:10.1080/714004358

Middle Eastern Studies

2001

DOI: 10.1080/714004358

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Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East

David Tal¹

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Cited by 4 publications

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“…16 Israeli premier David Ben-Gurion, in particular, sought to use the improvement to acquire arms from Britain, especially tanks. 17 The Foreign Office recognized that 'the Centurions are really the touchstone of our relations as far as the Israelis are concerned'. 18 For its part, Britain recognized the benefits of improved relations with Israel, symbolized by the invitation extended to Golda Meir to visit London in August 1958, followed by the decision in December to lift the former embargo and supply Israel with Centurion tanks.…”

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Centurions and Chieftains: Tank Sales and British Policy towards Israel in the Aftermath of the Six-Day War

Smith¹

2014

Contemporary British History

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Israeli relations. A neglected aspect of the development of British policy towards Israel has been the intense debates among British decision-makers regarding the supply of tanks to Israel following the 1967 conflict. British reluctance to export the powerful Chieftain tank to Israel stemmed not only from an unwillingness to fuel an arms race in the Middle East, but also from a determination to protect ongoing and extensive British economic interests in the Arab world, especially oil supplies. In keeping with efforts to dissociate itself from Israel, Britain also sought to downplay, and even conceal from the Arab world, ongoing sales of the less sophisticated Centurion tank to Israel. In many ways, British policy towards Israel culminated in the decision during the 1973 Yom Kippur War to maintain an arms embargo to the region which, while not extending to all Arab countries, hit Israel especially hard as it desperately sought ammunition and spares for its Centurion tanks.

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Centurions and Chieftains: Tank Sales and British Policy towards Israel in the Aftermath of the Six-Day War

Smith¹

2014

Contemporary British History

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Fortitude at stake: the accidental crisis in American–Israeli relations, August 1958

Schonmann

2017

Israel Affairs

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In the summer of 1958, the Middle East was engulfed in crisis, and the Eisenhower administration was rethinking its regional policy. Israel saw a chance to demonstrate its value as a reliable strategic partner by supporting the Western military operation to secure Jordan. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion authorized overflights and tabled proposals for a strategic partnership. Though Washington proved responsive, Ben-Gurion abruptly terminated the overflights, and a severe diplomatic crisis ensued. It was neither sought nor welcomed by the parties, and left all baffled and dismayed. Ben-Gurion's behaviour confounded contemporaries and historians: was he intimidated by Soviet threats? Did he yield to coalition pressures? Was he engaging in brinkmanship? New evidence shows that the root cause of the crisis was accidental, and ultimately it served only to cast doubt over Israel's fortitude.

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Waiting for Dimona: The United States and Israel's development of nuclear capability

Gerlini

2009

Cold War History

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The article analyzes the American Government's approach to Israel's development of nuclear capability during the end of Eisenhower's second term. It reviews, in particular, the December 1960 diplomatic crisis between the US and Israel, and points out how during the peak of the crisis the outgoing administration reported to the Israeli Government serious concern regarding the possibility of a pre-emptive attack by the Arab States motivated by intelligence and press leaks on Israel's nuclear programme. According to United States documents, an Arab attack could have occurred if the Israelis had refused to open the Dimona nuclear site for inspection to confirm the peaceful nature of the plant. It is possible to assert that the inspections were more of a political tool for the Arabs than a genuine effort to deny Israel the ability to achieve nuclear weapons.

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Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East

Cited by 4 publications

References 1 publication

Centurions and Chieftains: Tank Sales and British Policy towards Israel in the Aftermath of the Six-Day War

Centurions and Chieftains: Tank Sales and British Policy towards Israel in the Aftermath of the Six-Day War

Fortitude at stake: the accidental crisis in American–Israeli relations, August 1958

Waiting for Dimona: The United States and Israel's development of nuclear capability

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