Seemings: still dispositions to believe

Werner, Preston J.

doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0363-4

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…However, he denies that 'appears' takes a phenomenal use, although this seems driven by the implausibility of appearances always carrying a certain sensory quale (Huemer, 2013, p.330), which is consistent with appearances nevertheless having a non-sensory phenomenal feel. (Tolhurst, 1998, p.298) refers to the 'felt veridicality' of seemings, and the phenomenal dimension of seemings is asserted by (Tucker, 2010, p.530), (Werner, 2014, p.1765), and (McAllister, 2018, to name a few.…”

Section: Truth-conduciveness In the Treatisementioning

confidence: 99%

Hume and reliabilism

Qu¹

2021

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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Hume's epistemological legacy is often perceived as a predominantly negative sceptical one. His infamous problem of induction continues to perplex philosophers to this day, and many of his sceptical worries maintain their interest in contemporary eyes (e.g. with regard to reason, the senses, substance, causation). Yet Hume's positive epistemological contributions also hold significance for philosophy in this day and age. In this paper, I aim to situate Hume's epistemology in a more contemporary context, particularly with regard to the theme of reliabilism that runs throughout this epistemology. This will take the shape of examining correspondences and contrasts between Hume's epistemologies in the Treatise and Enquiry and reliabilism, as well as an examination of how Hume's framework might handle some major challenges for reliabilist epistemologies. In particular, I argue that that while Hume is tempted to an epistemology that is intimately tied to truth in the Treatise, he backs away when confronted with the excesses of scepticism in the conclusion of Book 1, and winds up with an epistemology most similar to the contemporary epistemological frameworks of dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism. Yet, largely because of his reliance on the passions (a respect in which he diverges from these two contemporary frameworks), the epistemology of the Treatise remains crucially dissociated from truth. Meanwhile, in the first Enquiry, he proceeds to develop a two-tiered epistemological framework that first accords all our justification with default authority, and then founds all-things-considered epistemic justification on our evidence for the reliability of our faculties. The first tier most resembles the contemporary epistemological framework of conservatism, while the second tier most closely resembles approved-list reliabilism. In this, a clear reliabilist thread runs through the epistemology of the Enquiry. I will also argue that although Hume did not appear to fully appreciate one of the most significant challenges for reliabilism-that is, the generality problem-his philosophical framework nevertheless contains the beginnings of a response to it.

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Section: Truth-conduciveness In the Treatisementioning

confidence: 99%

Hume and reliabilism

Qu¹

2021

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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“…See also Hanna 2011's response. ) This problem doesn't affect the disposition view, which identifies a seeming that P with a mere disposition or inclination to believe that P (see for instance Swinburne 2001: 141-42, Sosa 2007: 258-59, Rogers and Matheson 2011and Werner 2014). The disposition view doesn't support (PC) because it is implausible that S's mere inclination to believe (whether rightly or wrongly) that P could give S justification for believing that P. The disposition view is arguably false for independent reasons (cf.…”

Section: The Nature Of Seemingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal Conservatism

Moretti¹

2015

Analysis

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Phenomenal conservatism is the view according to which, roughly, the way things seem or appear to be is a source of epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, for instance, one can have some justification for believing that the cat is on the mat simply because it seems visually to one that the cat is on the mat. 3 The central intuition of the phenomenal conservative is that one should grant that things are the way they appear to be unless one has reasons for doubting it. Phenomenal conservatism is internalist in character at least because it takes the seeming-based justification of one's beliefs to depend entirely on one's mental states (cf. Huemer 2006, 2011, 2014). 4 Phenomenal conservatism is customarily associated with Michael Huemer's work. Huemer defines phenomenal conservatism as follows: (PC) If it seems to [a subject] S that P, then, in absence of defeaters S thereby has some degree of justification for believing that P. (2007: 30) 5 Although (PC) is about S's propositional justification, there is a corresponding version of it about S's doxastic justification: 6 1 Thanks to Tommaso Piazza and Chris Tucker for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I'm grateful to the Von Humboldt Foundation for financial support through a Visiting Fellowship at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. 2 For a general introduction to phenomenal conservatism and cognate views see Tucker (2013b). A more elementary introduction is Huemer (2014). A rich anthology of phenomenal conservatism and related views is Tucker (2013a). 3 Phenomenal conservatism must not be confused with doxastic conservatism, which says that one's mere believing that P gives one some justification for P provided that one has no reason for doubting that belief (cf. Huemer 2014: §1d.

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“…The precise meaning of seemings is itself controversial, so I make this claim with some hesitation. See Werner () for discussion of some of the controversy.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Better Than Theism

Baras¹

2017

European J of Philosophy

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Many of the arguments for and against robust moral realism parallel arguments for and against theism. In this article, I consider one of the shared challenges: the explanatory challenge. The article begins with a presentation of Harman's formulation of the explanatory challenge as applied to moral realism and theism. I then examine two responses offered by robust moral realists to the explanatory challenge, one by Russ Shafer‐Landau and another by David Enoch. Shafer‐Landau argues that the moral realist can plausibly respond to the challenge in a way unavailable to theists. I argue that Shafer‐Landau's response is implausible as it stands and that once revised, it will apply to theism just as well. I then argue that Enoch's response, to the extent that it is plausible, can be used to defend theism as well.

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Seemings: still dispositions to believe

Cited by 4 publications

References 20 publications

Hume and reliabilism

Hume and reliabilism

Phenomenal Conservatism

The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Better Than Theism

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