Seeing What is the Kind Thing to Do: Perception and Emotion in Morality

Goldie, Peter

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01107.x

Cited by 88 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 20 publications

(34 reference statements)

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“…also Jacobson 2005, 387 ff. ), Goldie (2007) claims that we can literally perceive deontic facts. I agree with Goldie in that our perception of deontic facts or of other people’s psychological states is perception in the literal sense.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation

Döring¹

2007

Dialectica

280

147

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Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal (conceptual) connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief‐desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: it necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly.

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation

Döring¹

2007

Dialectica

280

147

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“…16 In the present section I outline and, by way of amending both DL e and RC e , respond to this empirical challenge. 15 Whilst both Millar (2000) and Goldie (2007) are sympathetic to the idea that some cases of value recognition are perceptual, neither would endorse this claim.…”

Section: Culture and Contextmentioning

confidence: 98%

Perceptual Recognition, Emotion, and Value

Smith¹

2016

Art, Mind, and Narrative

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I outline an account of perceptual knowledge and assess the extent to which it can be employed in a defence of perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition. I argue that considerations ruling out lucky knowledge give us some reason to doubt its prospects in the case of value recognition. I also discuss recent empirical work on cultural and contextual influences on emotional expression, arguing that a perceptual account of value recognition is consistent with current evidence.

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“…One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts in much the same way as we know everyday facts about the external world: by perception (e.g. Greco 2000, Millar 2000, Cuneo 2003, Goldie 2007, Prinz 2007, Audi 2009). According to this proposal, we can come to know that an action is morally wrong by literally seeing it.…”

Section: Moral Anti‐realism and Moral Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Perception and the Causal Objection

McBrayer¹

2010

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One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception -we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non-secondary, natural properties; or nonnatural properties. 1

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Seeing What is the Kind Thing to Do: Perception and Emotion in Morality

Cited by 88 publications

References 20 publications

Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation

Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation

Perceptual Recognition, Emotion, and Value

Moral Perception and the Causal Objection

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