Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation

Abstract

Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal (conceptual) connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief‐desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: it necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly.

Perceptions of Exercise Among School-Aged Children With Asthma

“…Perceptions involve emotions, both possessing intentional, subjective, and phenomenological characteristics (Doring). Perception involves interaction with the environment and incorporation of one"s emotions into placing representation on the experience or object (Doring;Barsalou, 2008). Both sensory and affective perception share similarities with the concept of belief in that once you visualize something you also believe it to be so (Doring).…”

“…Perception also involves the act of judgment (Benjamin, 2007;Doring, 2007). As we visualize and experience an event an evaluation occurs based on how the content is taken in.…”

“…According to Doring (2007), perception incorporates to some degree, both types of processes with sensory perception involving visualization and affective perception involving emotion. Perceptions involve emotions, both possessing intentional, subjective, and phenomenological characteristics (Doring).…”

“…Again, it is important to point out that the identified concepts were only used as a starting point in this grounded theory study and as new leads emerged through the data they were explored with an open mind through further theoretical sampling. Predominant concepts included in the proposed Perceptions of Exercise Framework include: interactions with the environment, cognitive characteristics, affective characteristics, and representation (Bandura, 1977(Bandura, , 1986Baranowski et al, 2002;Benjamin, 2007;Chian, Huang & Fu, 2006;Dilworth, 2005;Doring, 2007;Elder, Ayala, Zabinski, Prochaska & Gehrman, 2001;Givner, 1992;Kiviniemi, Voss-Humke & Seifert, 2007;Meyer, Kroner- …”

L’intentionnalité des émotions : du corps aux valeurs

“…11 Pour un développement de ce point, voir Tappolet (2000) et Döring (2007). 12 Ainsi, de même que, toutes choses étant égales, un état perceptif spécifique cause et justifie le jugement qu'un arbre se trouve devant moi, toutes choses étant égales une émotion de peur suscitée par ce chien cause et justifie le jugement que ce chien est dangereux.…”