Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Abstract

Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world, that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the proposal that, if your experience E immediately justifies you in believing that P, then (i) E has the content that P, and (ii) E's having the content that P is fixed by what it's like to have E. I start by clarifying this proposal and showing how it can be defended. I then argue against the proposal and develop an alternative. The discussion shows what role visual consciousness plays (and doesn't play) in the justification of perceptual beliefs.

The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience

“…Seeing Franco sitting can give you excellent reason to believe that Franco is sitting. This case is discussed in Silins (2011). 19 The last qualification is needed because in principle, S could have independent evidence for p, and her belief could be based on that evidence as well as on E. In such a case, B might be doxastically justified, thanks to its dependence on the other basis.…”

Looks and Perceptual Justification

“… Silins () gives other examples, which involve degrees of justification. If, looking at an array of dots, I'm immediately justified to some degree in believing there are 10 and to some degree in believing that there are 11.…”

The Agony of Defeat?

“…However, the comparative proposition is a poor candidate to be a content of my experience (Byrne , section 6). It looks then like an experience can give one immediate justification to believe that p even if it fails to have the content that p (see Silins for further discussion).…”