Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds

Krueger, Joel; Overgaard, Søren

doi:10.1515/9783110325843.297

Cited by 34 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 47 publications

(16 reference statements)

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“…Some DSP advocates argue that bodily movements are literal constituents of emotions. Accordingly, they argue that by seeing a proper part of an emotion (a facial expression) we are directly seeing the emotion itself, rather than simply an external sign of an emotion (Gallagher & Varga, 2014;Krueger & Overgaard, 2012). This argument is still open to them with the modular view of perception.…”

Section: Phenomenological Vs Psychological Definitions Of Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If mental states are literally "inner causes" of physical behavior, it seems that only behavior is literally perceivable. DSP advocates have given different answers to this worry; one is that behavior is a constitutive part of some mental states, so that the mental state is perceived by perceiving the behavior (see Krueger & Overgaard, 2012). As discussed earlier, this is a main reason that DSP has been defended mainly for emotions and intentions, which have more tight connections to behavior than epistemic mental states.…”

Section: Is Type 1 Mindreading Of Belief-like States a Form Of Dsp?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The direct social perception (DSP) thesis is one recent attempt to recharacterize the phenomena of mindreading (e.g., Bohl & Gangopadhyay, 2014;Gallagher, 2008a,b;Gallagher & Varga, 2014;Gangopadhyay & Miyahara, in press;Krueger, 2012;Krueger & Overgaard, 2012;McNeill, 2012;Smith, 2010, in press;Zahavi, 2007Zahavi, , 2008Zahavi, , 2011. DSP rejects the idea that most mindreading involves an inferential process from perceptual information about a person's bodily and verbal behavior to a cognitive representation of the mental states underlying that behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

Herschbach

2015

Consciousness and Cognition

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Section: Phenomenological Vs Psychological Definitions Of Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Is Type 1 Mindreading Of Belief-like States a Form Of Dsp?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

Herschbach

2015

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…In this paper we consider two recent proposals in this direction: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 2010) and the hybrid model (Krueger and Overgaard, 2012). We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections to both of them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceiving mental states: Co-presence and constitution

Danón

Kalpokas

2017

Filosofia Unisinos

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Recently, several philosophers have called attention to the idea that there are occasions on which we can perceive (at least some) mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals in this direction: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 2010) and the hybrid model (Krueger and Overgaard, 2012). We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections to both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts which allows us to avoid such objections. Broadly stated, our idea is that by perceiving other people's behaviors we also perceive their mental states because behaviors co-present some features of the latter, and that this perception of others' minds is direct and immediate because behavior is a constitutive part of the mental states in question.Keywords: mindreading, hybrid model, direct perception of other minds, co-presence thesis. RESUMONos últimos tempos, vários filósofos têm defendido a ideia de que, por vezes, podem-se perceber (pelo menos alguns) estados mentais dos outros. Neste artigo, vamos considerar duas propostas neste sentido: a tese da copresença (Smith, 2010) e o modelo híbrido (Krueger e Overgaard, 2012). Vamos examinar as alternativas mencionadas e apresentar algumas objeções contra eles. Então, vamos propor uma maneira de integrar ambas as explicações que nos permite evitar tais acusações. No geral, a nossa ideia é que, quando percebemos o comportamento dos outros nós também percebemos seus estados mentais, porque os estados mentais são coapresentados no comportamento, e que esta percepção das mentes dos outros é direta e imediata, porque o comportamento é parte integrante dos estados mentais em questão.Palavras-chave: leitura mental, modelo híbrido, a percepção direta de outras mentes , tese de copresença.

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“…This is sometimes supported, contra McGinn, by appeal to the facility of certain perceptual locutions in reporting the source of our knowledge of others' minds: 'I heard the anger in her voice'; 'I saw the pain in her eyes' [Green 2007;Stout 2010]. The claim can been developed in different ways: some hold that mental states are expressed in behaviour and thus perceptible [Green 2007]; others hold that behaviour is partly constitutive of mentality, such that in seeing someone's behaviour one sees their mental features [Krueger and Overgaard 2012]. These claims turn on wider issues in the philosophy of mind about the relation between mental states and behaviour.…”

Section: Perception and Inferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Skepticism about Other Minds

Skepticism : From Antiquity to the Present

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Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds

Cited by 34 publications

References 47 publications

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

Perceiving mental states: Co-presence and constitution

Skepticism about Other Minds

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