Security and Privacy Analysis of Tree-LSHB+ Protocol

Qian, Xiaofei; Liu, Xinbao; Yang, Shanlin; Zuo, Chao

doi:10.1007/s11277-014-1699-x

Cited by 8 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 25 publications

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“…In parallel, improved successors of HB-MP were introduced: HB-MP+ [15], HB-MP++ [16], HB-MP* [17]. The HB family also includes Trusted-HB [18], NLHB [19], HB N [20], and GHB# [21], as well as HB+PUF [22], PUF-HB [23], and Tree-LSHB [24,25]. Avoine et al [1] emphasize that the OOV attack remains one of the keystones in the analysis of any new HB-like authentication scheme.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Man-In-The-Middle Attack against Certain Authentication Protocols Revisited: Insights into the Approach and Performances Re-Evaluation

2020

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We address a class of authentication protocols called “HB” ones and the man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack, reported at the ASIACRYPT conference, called OOV-MIM (Ouafi-Overbeck-Vaudenay MIM). Analysis of the considered attack and its systematic experimental evaluation are given. It is shown that the main component of OOV-MIM, the algorithm for measuring the Hamming weight of noise vectors, outputs incorrect results as a consequence of the employed approximation of the probability distributions. The analysis reveals that, practically, the only scenario in which the OOV-MIM attack is effective is the one in which two incorrect estimations produced by the algorithm for measuring the Hamming weight, when coupled, give the correct result. This paper provides additional insights into the OOV-MIM and corrected claims about the performance/complexity showing that the performances of the considered attack have been overestimated, i.e., that the complexity of the attack has been underestimated. Particularly, the analysis points out the reasons for the incorrect claims and to the components of the attack that do not work as expected.

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