Secure cell relay routing protocol for sensor networks

Abstract

Past researches on sensor network routing have been focused on efficiency and effectiveness of data dissemination. Few of them consider security issues during the design time of routing protocols. Security is very important for many sensor network applications. Studies and experiences have shown that considering security during design time is the best way to provide security for sensor network routing. In this paper, we propose an efficient key management scheme and a novel secure routing protocol—Secure cell relay (SCR) for sensor networks. We also present an effective key setup scheme for sensor nodes deployed in the later stage. We analyze the security of SCR under various attacks and show that SCR is very effective in defending against several sophisticated attacks, including selective forwarding, sinkhole, wormhole, Sybil, hello flooding, and clone attacks. SCR is an energy‐efficient routing protocol with acceptable security overhead. Our simulations demonstrate that with all the security primitives, SCR still has lower energy consumption and higher delivery ratio than a popular routing protocol—directed diffusion. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Wireless sensor network survey

“…Secure cell relay (SCR): SCR [96] routing protocol is designed to provide resistance against security attacks. SCR is a cluster-based algorithm where nodes form a cluster (cell) based on their locations.…”

Authentic delay bounded event detection in heterogeneous wireless sensor networks

“…Following the requirement of secure routing, some integrated algorithms have been proposed. In [16], the authors proposed the Secure Cell Relay (SCR) routing protocol. SCR is an energy-efficient routing protocol with acceptable security overhead.…”

Security Enhancement for Real-Time Routing Protocol in Wireless Sensor Networks

“…The manipulated sensor data attacks are divided into two classes that include manipulating user data directly and influencing the underlying routing topology. SRTLD defends against the attacks that influence the underlying routing protocol such as selective forwarding, sinkhole, Sybil, wormholes, and HELLO flood attacks [5,6].…”

“…In particular, it is easy to eavesdrop or cause a network layer attacks which fall into one of the following categories: manipulating routing information, selective forwarding, Sybil, sinkhole, wormhole, and Hello flooding (unidirectional) attacks. Furthermore, most real-time communication and coordination routing protocols do not address security, so it is easy for an adversary to exploit those routing protocols on a given WSNs [5,6]. Lightweight security schemes are required in real-time routing protocols for WSN.…”