Secure Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks in Vehicular Communications

Abstract

With wireless sensor networks (WSNs), a driver can access various useful information for convenient driving, such as traffic congestion, emergence, vehicle accidents, and speed. However, a driver and traffic manager can be vulnerable to various attacks because such information is transmitted through a public channel. Therefore, secure mutual authentication has become an important security issue, and many authentication schemes have been proposed. In 2017, Mohit et al. proposed an authentication protocol for WSNs in vehicular communications to ensure secure mutual authentication. However, their scheme cannot resist various attacks such as impersonation and trace attacks, and their scheme cannot provide secure mutual authentication, session key security, and anonymity. In this paper, we propose a secure authentication protocol for WSNs in vehicular communications to resolve the security weaknesses of Mohit et al.’s scheme. Our authentication protocol prevents various attacks and achieves secure mutual authentication and anonymity by using dynamic parameters that are changed every session. We prove that our protocol provides secure mutual authentication by using the Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic, which is a widely accepted formal security analysis. We perform a formal security verification by using the well-known Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications tool, which shows that the proposed protocol is safe against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. We compare the performance and security properties of our protocol with other related schemes. Overall, the proposed protocol provides better security features and a comparable computation cost. Therefore, the proposed protocol can be applied to practical WSNs-based vehicular communications.

A Lightweight and Provable Secured Certificateless Signcryption Approach for Crowdsourced IIoT Applications

“…Here, we compare our proposed scheme with those ASGMPM [8], AIK [48], ZC [50], LW [51], and LM [52], with respect to communication overheads an scheme needs very little communication overhead. Our results based on [57,58], |G2| ≌ |G| ≌ 1024bits for bilinear pairing, |P| ≌ 1024 bits for the discrete logarith |G| respectively. So for the reduction, we use the values of [47] 7EX + 2BP 1EX + 7BP HB [48] 5EX 5EX ZC [50] 7EX + 1BP 5EX + 4BP LW [51] 7EM 5EM LM [52] 4 EM 3 EM Proposed Scheme 4HDM 3HDM Table 3.Comparisons with respect to milliseconds (ms).…”

“…Here, we compare our proposed scheme with those ASGMPM [8], AIK [27], PM [47], HB [50], LW [51], and LM [52], with respect to communication overheads and shows that our needs very little communication overhead. Our results based on [57,58], in which |G1| ≌ |G| ≌ 1024bits for bilinear pairing, |P| ≌ 1024 bits for the discrete logarithm problem, |q|≌ 1024 bits for the discrete logarithm problem, |q|…”

“…If the scheme needs message at the time of sending, it means the channel required low re our proposed scheme with those ASGMPM [8], AIK [27], PM [47], HB LM [52], with respect to communication overheads and shows that our mmunication overhead. Our results based on [57,58], in which |G1| ≌ ilinear pairing, |P| ≌ 1024 bits for the discrete logarithm problem, |q|≌ 80 bits for a hyper elliptic curve, and | | = 1024 bits, respectively. The following are the required communication overhead for ASGMPM [8], AIK [27], PM [47], HB [48], ZC [50], LW [51], and LM [52]:…”

“…Here, we compare our proposed scheme with those ASGMPM [8], AIK [27], PM [ [48], ZC [50], LW [51], and LM [52], with respect to communication overheads and shows t scheme needs very little communication overhead. Our results based on [57,58], in which |G2| ≌ |G| ≌ 1024bits for bilinear pairing, |P| ≌ 1024 bits for the discrete logarithm problem 160 bits for elliptic curve, |n| MPM [8], AIK [27], PM [47], HB [48], ZC [50], LW [51], and LM [52], ction, we use the values of Table 3 ad ead means that how many extra bits will be sent along with the actual mportant part of the data communication channels. If the scheme needs message at the time of sending, it means the channel required low re our proposed scheme with those ASGMPM [8], AIK [27], PM [47], HB LM [52], with respect to communication overheads and shows that our mmunication overhead.…”

SUBBASE: An Authentication Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Based on User Biometrics

“…It is susceptible to offline password guessing attack and smart card stolen attack and session key compromise attacks are possible. SungJin et al [15] proposed a smart card based authentication protocol for wireless sensor network in vehicular communication.…”