A lightweight anonymous two‐factor authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks in Internet of Vehicles

Abstract

SummaryInternet of Vehicles (IoV), as the next generation of transportation systems, tries to make highway and public transportation more secure than used to be. In this system, users use public channels for their communication so they can be the victims of passive or active attacks. Therefore, a secure authentication protocol is essential for IoV; consequently, many protocols are presented to provide secure authentication for IoV. In 2018, Yu et al proposed a secure authentication protocol for WSNs in vehicular communications and claimed that their protocol could satisfy all crucial security features of a secure authentication protocol. Unfortunately, we found that their protocol is susceptible to sensor capture attack, user traceability attack, user impersonation attack, and offline sink node's secret key guessing attack. In this paper, we propose a new authentication protocol for IoV which can solve the weaknesses of Yu et al's protocol. Our protocol not only provides anonymous user registration phase and revocation smart card phase but also uses the biometric template in place of the password. We use both Burrow‐Abadi‐Needham (BAN) logic and real‐or‐random (ROR) model to present the formal analysis of our protocol. Finally, we compare our protocol with other existing related protocols in terms of security features and computation overhead. The results prove that our protocol can provide more security features and it is usable for IoV system.

A Lightweight Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol Using Fog Nodes in Social Internet of Vehicles

“…en, Yu et al [25] proposed an authenticated protocol in vehicular communications. In 2020, Sadri et al [26] demonstrated that Yu et al's protocol [25] was susceptible to sensor capture attacks and impersonation attacks and could not provide traceability. Additionally, Sadri and Rajabzadeh Asaar [26] proposed a protocol in the IoV environment, which was based on lightweight primitives.…”

“…In 2020, Sadri et al [26] demonstrated that Yu et al's protocol [25] was susceptible to sensor capture attacks and impersonation attacks and could not provide traceability. Additionally, Sadri and Rajabzadeh Asaar [26] proposed a protocol in the IoV environment, which was based on lightweight primitives. In 2021, Wu et al [27] proposed a protocol in IoV, and the protocol realized authentication key exchange (AKE).…”

A Provably Secure Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

“…en Yu et al proposed a new security authentication protocol and proved that their protocol can resist various known attacks. In 2020, Sadri and Rajabzadeh Asaar [41] proved that Yu et al's protocol is vulnerable to tracking attacks, impersonation attacks, sensor capture attacks, and so forth and proposed a secure protocol for application in VANETs.…”

Security and Privacy Analysis of Vinoth et al.’s Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme for Industrial IoT

“…This means that the user's identity is disclosed only to an authorized set of GWN and IoT sensing devices during the authentication sessions. Therefore, to preserve user privacy, authenticated key agreement schemes [23][24][25][26][27] thwart attempts to disclose or link users' identities by exploiting their authentication sessions.…”