Proceedings 1998 International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (Cat. No.98TB100250)
DOI: 10.1109/icpads.1998.741118
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Secure and scalable inter-domain group key management for N-to-N multicast

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Cited by 18 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…Let Rz define a constant rekey message size in bits. Clearly the total system bandwidth Bsys By taking in to account the membership dwell time in service s, we multiply (19) by 1/μ time units such that By using (11) and (13), the simulation result in Fig. 13 show that using LKH rekeying approach with a branching factor of d=4 gives the best approximation value of E[L⍴i/s] +E[J⍴v/s]=ROT for s=1 as proven in [5].…”
Section: Bandwidth Consumption In Smgkmmentioning
confidence: 90%
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“…Let Rz define a constant rekey message size in bits. Clearly the total system bandwidth Bsys By taking in to account the membership dwell time in service s, we multiply (19) by 1/μ time units such that By using (11) and (13), the simulation result in Fig. 13 show that using LKH rekeying approach with a branching factor of d=4 gives the best approximation value of E[L⍴i/s] +E[J⍴v/s]=ROT for s=1 as proven in [5].…”
Section: Bandwidth Consumption In Smgkmmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…Work in [9] further categorizes the GKM as common TEK and Independent TEK per subgroup approaches depending on how the TEK is distributed in the framework. Common TEK approaches such as in [5,10,11] utilize one TEK for all group members and commonly suffer from 1-affect-n phenomenon; thus rekeying of the new TEK affect all the members subscribed to the same group in the entire network whenever a membership change occurs. Independent TEK per subgroup approaches try to alleviate the 1-affect-n phenomenon caused by common TEK approaches such as in [12], by enabling each subgroup to independently manage its own TEK, thus rekeying of the new TEK is localized within the affected subgroup during membership change.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Due to the reason that the movement between two subgroups in the centralized protocols give rise to two subgroup re-keying and the global key update, which is much bigger than our protocol in PKI. In such regular case, our protocol just gets 25% and 55% of the real re-key messages and the re-key events compared to centralized protocols without PKI in average respectively [8,15,16] .…”
Section: Simulation Studiesmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Similar to a join event, the re-keying process only happens within the subgroup by multicasting the new K S,i to the remaining group members encrypted by members' individual keys. While in centralized key management schemes without PKI [8,15,16] , the group manager still needs to update the global group key and subgroup key database and Let P denotes the data packets; ) (P K + means using K to encrypt P ; and ) (P K − means using K to decrypt P .…”
Section: Leave Eventmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In brief, having subgroup agents decrypt and re-encrypt the data packets is a drawback, both from a performance point of view and from a security point of view. IDGKM 20 utilizes the concept of Iolus and a distributed key management architecture to deliver the common group key. It also suffers the drawback of trust in third parties that is necessary for key distribution.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%