Cooperation Norms in Multiple‐Stage Punishment

Abstract

Carpenter and Matthews (2009) examine the cooperation norms determining people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game. Their ndings are striking: absolute norms outperform the relative norms commonly regarded as the determinants of punishment. Using multiple punishment stages and self-contained episodes of interaction, we disentangle the eects of retaliation and norm-related punishment. An additional treatment provides data on the norms bystanders use in judging punishment actions. Our results partly conrm the ndings of Carpenter and Matthews: only for the punishment-related decisions in the rst iteration is the absolute norm outperformed by the self-referential norm set by the punisher's own contribution. For the decisions in all later iterations, as well as for bystanders' support in all iterations, the absolute norm organizes our data best. In contrast to the study by Carpenter and Matthews, we nd an absolute norm of 3/4 of players' endowments to be both consistent across decisions and relatively stable over time.

The Dose Does it: Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games

“…Remarkably, in dynPUN, success or failure of a group cannot be predicted by the initial contribution average or contribution variance. What seems to make the difference is that in those dynPUN groups who succeed, right from the start there seems to be a common understanding (or "social norm") of when and how punishment should be used (see Nicklisch and Wolff, 2011;Reuben and Riedl, 2013). Only when punishment is not possible (in dynNOpun), initial contribution levels have strong predictive power for overall success.…”

In Broad Daylight: Full Information and Higher-order Punishment Opportunities Promote Cooperation

“…Locke asserted that "resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it," and that people therefore willingly cede their rights to punish individually to the state, which punishes on their behalf. The potential of counter-punishment to deter and thus to undermine the efficacy of punishment, while adding to its cost, has recently been demonstrated in laboratory experiments by Denant-Boemont et al (2007), Engel et al (2011), Nicklisch and Wolff (2011), Nikiforakis (2008), and Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011). Nikiforakis (2008) suggests that the problem may be a fundamental one, sub-titling his paper "Can we really govern ourselves?…”

Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation

“…However, both go on to show that the conditions for T NÀ1 to invade a defecting population are extreme. Two characteristics of the present model suggest different aspects may be important in our case: most importantly, we incorporate punishment and 9 We do not include strategies using antisocial punishment as studies disentangling antisocial punishment and retaliation by design do not find evidence of 'unprovoked' antisocial punishment (e.g., Nicklisch and Wolff, 2011). Other studies such as Cheung (2012) and Cinyabuguma et al (2006) also tend to attribute most antisocial punishment to what may be called ''pre-emptive retaliation'' (Cheung, 2012), while Herrmann et al (2008) merely report received previous-round punishment to be a very strong predictor of antisocial punishment.…”

“…Other studies such as Cheung (2012) and Cinyabuguma et al (2006) also tend to attribute most antisocial punishment to what may be called ''pre-emptive retaliation'' (Cheung, 2012), while Herrmann et al (2008) merely report received previous-round punishment to be a very strong predictor of antisocial punishment. Unfortunately, there has not been a study run with a design similar to Nicklisch and Wolff (2011) in any of the places known to exhibit high rates of antisocial punishment. 10 The reaction to punishment was added for completeness as it is not part of the original models; it will be irrelevant in our main model.…”

“…Stephens (2005). 4 Recent laboratory evidence suggests additional punishment stages are used for additional punishment assignments and retaliation, but rarely for sanction enforcement, e.g., Nicklisch and Wolff (2011).…”